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IS TITLE VI A MAGIC BULLET? ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM IN
THE CONTEXT OF POLITICAL-ECONOMIC PROCESSES AND
IMPERATIVES*
Steven A. Light*
Kathryn R.L. Rand**

The legal academy has embraced litigation under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 as the new litigation strategy in the strugglefor environmentaljustice. This Article examines the question of whether Title
VI really is the "magic bullet" against environmental racism that its
proponents claim. Specifically, the authors examine the effectiveness of
Title VI litigation within the broadercontext of the environmental justice movement and against the background of political-economic
constraints. In the authors' opinion, Title VI claims share many of the
same limitations that have plagued environmental justice litigation under the Equal Protection Clause, although Title VI plaintiffs have a
better chance of prevailing in individual suits because of Title VIs less
onerous burden of proof. The authors view the efficacy of Title VI litigation as necessarily limited by the fact that environmental racism is, in
essence, a political problem: the systematic roots of environmental racism run deep and encompass political-economicfactors that Title VI
litigation cannot address. Although the authorsdo not entirely disregard
the benefits of Title VI litigation (e.g., publicity for the cause, education
of the public and legal community), they are cautious about the recent
focus on this strategy and suggest that this type of litigation be used
only in concert with other environmentaljustice strategies. The authors
conclude that the environmentaljustice movement should focus on a diversified strategy embracing grassroots empowerment. Minority
communities, disproportionately burdened by environmental racism,
would benefit most from an inclusive environmental justice movement
that concentrates its efforts on increasing the political and economic
power of people of color, as well as their participation in the democratic
process.

t An earlier version of this Article was presented at the 1996 Annual Meeting of
the American Political Science Association under the title, Is Title VI a Magic Bullet?
Environmental Racism in the Context of PoliticalProcesses and Economic Imperatives.
* Ph.D. Candidate, Political Science, Northwestern University. B.A. 1990, Yale
College.
** Law Clerk, Chief Judge J.P. Stadtmueller, United States District Court, Eastern
District of Wisconsin. B.A. 1990, University of North Dakota; J.D. 1993, University of
Michigan Law School.
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Is Title VI a Magic Bullet?

We don't have the complexion for protection.'
-Richard

Moore, Co-Director, Southwest Organizing Project,
on his Latino neighborhood in Albuquerque

INTRODUCTION
People at society's margins-often the impoverished or people
of color 2-have the most to gain from the interaction of public and
private actors, but the least to offer to those possessing power and
wealth. Policy decisions tangibly impact those who may remain
faceless to government or industrial interests. Policies can either uplift or devastate the lives of real people at society's margins-whose
aspirations and values may be no different from those of the individuals who have the power to make policy.
Public policy reflects and refracts private prejudice.' In our
democratic society, questions of distributive justice flow from pondering how the desires of private actors (e.g., citizens, corporations,
or institutions) are received, challenged, altered, and ultimately
transmitted through public policy. When do the needs of those on
the margins take some priority over the desires of those who sit
squarely in the catbird seat? That is, in a diverse and complex collective, how should benefits and burdens be allocated when benefits
are scarce and burdens overabundant? How should governmental

1. Karl Grossman, The People of Color Environmental Summit, in UNEQUAL PROTECTION: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR 272, 281 (Robert D.
Bullard ed., 1994) [hereinafter UNEQUAL PROTECTION].

2. This Article employs varied terminology for discussing individuals and groups.
Most frequently, the Article uses the term "minority"-indicative of numerical or
subordinate status-as a shorthand device for persons of color, in spite of its potentially loaded (and socially constructed) delegitimizing connotations. At the same
time, the Article avoids a phrase like "the Black community" because of its commonuse tendency to obscure what James E. Blackwell cogently defines as "a highly diversified set of interrelated structures and aggregates of people who are held
together by the forces of white oppression and racism." JAMES E. BLACKWELL, THE
BLACK COMMUNITY: DIVERSrrY AND UNITY at xiii (1985). "African American" and
"Black" are used interchangeably, "Latino" is used as a general term for those peoples whose diverse natures are joined loosely by primarily Spanish-speaking
heritages, and "Native American" is used for those peoples who were indigenous to
the United States prior to its colonization.
3. See Thomas V. Tonnesen, Preface, in AMERICAN INDIANS: SOCIAL JUSTICE AND

PUBLIC POLICY at x (Donald E. Green & Thomas V. Tonnesen eds., 1991) ("Behind all
public policy are private thoughts, private beliefs, private assumptions, private
prejudices .... ).
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and non-governmental actors
4 use social resources efficiently in order
to reach desired outcomes?
One social resource, varied in applications and results, is technology. Modern forms of technology have had several effects on
politics. Aside from beneficial outcomes, "[o]ne [effect] is a growth of
knowledge in areas that are not easily accessible to people who lack
specialized training in scientific or technical fields, . . . [and a] related
effect is the influence of technical and administrative elites whose
knowledge, expertise, and ideas frame the issues and structure the
choices government institutions make."' Technocratic and scientistic
policymaking shapes both opportunities and outcomes for individuals and communities whose power is curtailed by a lack of
access to information and decisionmaking institutions.6 Priorities are
shaped by concerns that have little tangible meaning to many, and
are framed by large corporate or governmental interests that may
have dramatic social, political, and economic downsides for those
who bear more burdens than receive benefits.
Whether discernible on the basis of intent or effects, racial discrimination appears in many guises. An increasing body of scholarly
work focuses on varied manifestations of "environmental racism"racial or ethnic discrimination in environmental policymaking, administration, or enforcement of laws-and the "environmental
justice" movement-a loosely connected series of grassroots and legal actions attempting to redress or prevent disproportionate
burdening of impoverished minorities. Most legal scholarship centers on legal strategies, including Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection claims or state law, both of which have poor track records
and limited future efficacy. 8 At the same time, journalistic and academic accounts of community activism, or the actions of local, state,
and federal political bodies, fail to focus on case-specific or macro-

4. See PETER S. WENZ, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE at xii (1988) (examining the philosophical underpinnings of questions concerning distributive justice using
environmental issues as illustrations).
5. DANIELJ. FIORINO, MAKING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 5 (1995).
6. See Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charadein Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 1613, 1676 (1995) ("Once toxic standards are delegated to scientists for resolution, interested citizenry, and often the government officials themselves, are largely
excluded from the decisionmaking and are forced to pay a high entry cost to discern
at what point policy choices were made and what those choices were." (footnotes
omitted)).
7. See, e.g., CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1993) [hereinafter CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL
RACISM]; ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: ISSUES, POLICIES, AND SOLUTIONS (Bunyan Bryant
ed., 1995) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE].
8. See infra Part III.A.
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level political-economic imperatives that may be determinative of
discriminatory policies or unsuccessful claims for remediation.
Recently, a stream of analysis has championed increased reliance on litigation under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 9 as a
tool in the struggle for environmental justice 0 The jury is still out,
however, on the efficacy of legal and administrative actions pursuant to Title VI. This Article situates Title VI litigation within the
context of political processes at the federal, state, and local levels. By
examining the history of the environmental justice movement and
the efficacy of both grassroots mobilizations and legal or administrative efforts, and by probing underlying political-economic
constants and variables, this Article sheds light on two challenges
facing the environmental justice movement: (1) the difficulties inherent in taking on the vested interest in economic development held
by both corporations and political institutions, and (2) the problems
faced by communities of color attempting to achieve selfempowerment through collective action.
This Article examines avenues of redress and pollution prevention for impoverished people of color that flow from Title VI
litigation strategies within the larger context of the environmental
justice movement. Environmental justice issues can serve as tools
with whicl- to question status quo distributive policymaking processes and outcomes. Specifically, this Article concerns itself with
practical routes toward increasing distributive justice and democratic efficacy.
Part I of the Article discusses the background of the
environmental justice movement, locating its impetus within the
societal importance accorded economic development-a situation
under which minorities have borne the brunt of resultant
externalized pollution. It further argues that, at the same time,
minorities historically have found little redress through the
traditional mainstream environmental movement. In Part II, the
Article defines the overarching principles of the environmental
justice movement, describing two of the movement's catalysts (a
grassroots protest and a large-scale study of hazardous waste sites)
and its current characteristics. Part III discusses the role of civil

9. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d (West 1994).

10. See, e.g., James H. Colopy, The Road Less Traveled: Pursuing Environmental Justice Through Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 125 (1994);
Michael Fisher, Environmental Racism Claims Brought Under Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act, 25 ENVTL. L. 285 (1995); Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "EnvironmentalJustice ": The

Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 787, 793 (1993);

Donna Gareis-Smith, Comment, Environmental Racism: The Failure of Equal Protection
to Provide a Judicial Remedy and the Potential of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 13
TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 57 (1994).
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rights litigation in the movement, illustrating the failure of equal
protection claims before turning to the standards under which
claims might be brought under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act-a new and highly touted form of environmental litigation. In
Part IV, the Article situates Title VI litigative strategies within the
context of several political-economic factors constraining Title VI's
potential for efficacious redress of environmental harms. Balancing
the benefits of Title VI litigation against limitations that are framed
by political economy, it suggests reasons for the strategic employment of Title VI litigation. Finally, Part V emphasizes the need for a
multipronged tactical approach to pursuing environmental justice
that focuses strategically on the political-economic roots of environmental inequities and seeks to empower minorities at the grassroots
level.
I. THE BACKGROUND OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE MOVEMENT

Social movements arise in a dialectical process that occurs
between ordinary people and dominant institutions." Minorities,
perceiving that they have received the short end of the stick (that is,
received a scarcity of benefits relative to burdens), have organized in
recent years in response to environmental racism. As the environmental justice movement has expanded, so too have scholars
broadened their explanations of the racism that precipitated it.
Underlying such accounts, racial discrimination may be defined
as "actions or practices carried out by dominant groups, or their representatives, which have a differential and negative impact on
members of subordinate groups.', 2 Environmental racism comprises
a subset of discrimination. Professor Bunyan Bryant's identification
of the problematique is appropriately specific: Environmental racism, he writes,
refers to those institutional rules, regulations, and policies
or government or corporate decisions that deliberately

11. See generally ALDON D. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT:
BLACK COMMUNITIES ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE (1984); FRANCES Fox PIVEN &
RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY SUCCEED, How THEY
FAIL (1977).

12. Michael Gelobter, Toward a Model of "Environmental Discrimination," in RACE
AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS: A TIME FOR DISCOURSE 65

(Bunyan Bryant & Paul Mohai eds., 1992) (crediting definition to JOE R. FEAGIN &
CLAIRECE BOOHER FEAGIN, DISCRIMINATION AMERICAN STYLE: INSTITUTIONAL RACISM
AND SEXISM 20-21 (1986)) [hereinafter RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL

HAZARDS].
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target certain communities for least desirable land uses,
resulting in the disproportionate exposure of toxic and
hazardous waste on communities based upon certain
prescribed biological characteristics. Environmental racism
is the unequal protection against toxic and hazardous
waste exposure and the systematic exclusion of people of
color from environmental decisions affecting their communities. 3
Implicit in these definitions of environmental racism, and in the environmental justice movement, is a political-economic framework
that assists in shaping the voices of those who are engaged in challenging the status quo. 14
A. Historical Bias Toward Development over Human Rights
Willful acts of despoliation aside, environmentalists nonetheless
warn of the effects of unchecked economic development on finite
resources. Growth machines, urban networks of interlocking associations and governmental units, "unite behind a doctrine of valuefree development-the notion that free markets alone should determine land use."' 6 Members of the "growth coalition" ("boosters,"
such as rentiers, developers, financiers, construction interests, the
local media, and local cultural institutions) concern themselves with

13. Bunyan Bryant, Introduction,in ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 5. For
a similar definition, credited to Benjamin Chavis, see Grossman, supra note 1,at 278
("Environmental racism is racial discrimination in environmental policy-making, the
enforcement of regulations and laws, the deliberate targeting of communities of color
for toxic waste facilities, the official sanctioning of the life-threatening presence of
poisons and pollutants in our communities, and the history of excluding people of
color from leadership of the environmental movement.").
14. For a model of environmental discrimination that incorporates institutionalized racism, political economy, and analysis of power structures, see Gelobter, supra
note 12, at 74-75 (arguing that "[dliscriminatory outcomes should, therefore, be seen
as the interaction of internal processes, external structures, and wider ideological and
historical contexts and understandings. Only in this way can we understand the pervasiveness and persistence of discrimination despite changes at the institutional and
individual levels in the last twenty years.").
15. See, e.g., ALBERT GORE, JR., EARTH IN THE BALANCE: ECOLOGY AND THE HUMAN
SPIRIT (1992). For an additional perspective, see WENZ, supra note 4, at 9-10
(discussing Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, in ETHICS AND POPULATION
3-18 (Michael D. Bayles ed., 1976)). Wenz observes that while "every litter bit" does
not hurt the environment, even non-willful harms may be prevented by personal
lifestyle changes and restraint. Id. at 10. Such logic may be extended to the corporate
and industrial world.
16. JOHN R. LOGAN & HARVEY L. MOLOTCH, URBAN FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL

ECONOMY OF PLACE 32-36 (1987).
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both substantive and procedural questions of resource procurement,
routing, and allocation, with aggregate economic growth seen as a
public good. 7 Yet whether economic growth is in the public interest
depends in large part upon which portion of the public one considers, and how one defines their interests."
While economic growth may not inherently result in an unequal
distribution of benefits, there is no governmental compulsion to engage a system of allotment based on measures of ultimate outcome.
Under a definition of human rights that involves both equal opportunity and equal outcome for all people, developmental interests
historically have trumped human rights. "[Liocal growth under current arrangements is a transfer of wealth and life chances from the
general public to the rentier groups and their associates."' 9 Even
more important for those living in areas such as Louisiana's "Cancer
Alley," 20 "as is generally true with geographically uneven development, people's location at the low end of the stratification of places
compounds their individual disadvantages. For someone trapped
behind political boundaries, geography becomes destiny. 2 1
Economic growth and development carry a variety of impacts.
Among the resultant, often-externalized costs is pollution. Both
point and non-point sources of pollution are diverse and their impacts highly contingent on various factors. 2 On the whole, the result
for communities of color is a host of undesired outcomes.
B. Minorities Bear More Burdens and Receive Fewer Benefits
1. Empirical Evidence
Recent empirical evidence demonstrates the disproportionate
environmental burden placed on communities containing a high
17. See id.; see also Harvey Molotch, The City as Growth Machine: Toward a Political
Economy of Place, 82 AM. J. Soc. 309 (1976).

18. See LOGAN & MOLOTCH, supra note 16, at 32-36.
19. See id. at 98, 198.
20. See Fisher, supra note 10, at 330 (citing LOUISIANA ADVISORY COMM. TO THE
U.S. COMM'N CIVIL RIGHTS, THE BATTLE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN LOUISIANA
...GOVERNMENT, INDUSTRY, AND THE PEOPLE 63 (1993), which found disproportion-

ate siting of hazardous waste facilities among impoverished areas with high
concentrations of African Americans in the industrial corridor running from Baton
Rouge to New Orleans).
21. LOGAN & MOLOTCH, supra note 16, at 98, 198. The rhetoric of the argument

should not be taken to indicate an element of inevitability, however. Even minorities
with low levels of resources and perceived political efficacy can, and do, mobilize
politically against corporate interests. See discussion infra Part II.
22. See Gelobter, supra note 12, at 72 (describing pollution as having "three impor-

tant physical -characteristics: magnitude, location, and duration").
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percentage of minorities. While socioeconomic status should not be
discounted as a contributing factor, numerous studies show that race
is more clearly linked to the disproportionate impacts of pollution.
Not only is race more strongly related than is status to the distribution of environmental hazards, but it also has been found to be the
single best predictor of the presence of commercial hazardous waste
facilities.2'
The specifics are convincing, if not downright disturbing. A report by the Louisiana Advisory Committee indicated that state and
local systems for permitting, siting, and expanding hazardous waste
and chemical facilities in Cancer Alley, the industrial corridor between Baton Rouge and New Orleans, disproportionately affected
many African American communities." A 1992 empirical study of
commercial toxic waste facilities in Detroit, Michigan, found that
eighteen percent of the residents living more than one and one-half
miles from commercial hazardous waste facilities were minorities,
but that within one mile, the percentage of residents who were minorities increased by two and one-half times, to forty-eight percent.7
The United Church of Christ's study26 found that more than fifteen

23. See generally COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST,
ToxIc WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL
AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE

SITES (1987) (finding that a community's racial composition was the key to explaining presence or non-presence of hazardous waste facilities in a given area)
[hereinafter UCC REPORT]; Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Environmental Racism: Reviewing the Evidence, in RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS,

supra note 12, at 163, 167 ("[Rlegardless of the environmental hazard and regardless
of the scope of the study, in nearly every case the distribution of pollution has been
found to be inequitable by income. And with only one exception, the distribution of
pollution has been found to be inequitable by race."); id. at 169 ("[R]ace has additional effect on the distribution of environmental hazards that is independent of
class."); Grossman, supra note 1, at 284 (citing evidence that environmental racism
follows race rather than class lines). But see Douglas L. Anderson et al., Environmental
Equity: Evaluating TSDF Siting over the Past Two Decades, WASTE AGE, July 1994
(reporting the results of analysis by the Social and Demographic Research Institute at
the University of Massachusetts, which revisits the UCC report as finding no statistical differences between the percentages of minorities in host and non-host census
tracts); Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE L.J. 1383 (1994) [hereinafter Been, LULUs
in Minority Neighborhoods] (suggesting that such research generally does not incorporate methodology establishing that host communities were disproportionately
minority or impoverished at the time of the site selection); Vicki Been, Market Dynamics and the Siting of LULUs: Questions to Raise in the Classroom About Existing Research,
96 W. VA. L. REV. 1069 (1994).
24. See Fisher, supra note 10, at 330 (citing LOUISIANA ADVISORY COMM., supra note
20).
25. See Mohai & Bryant, supra note 23, at 171-72.
26. See discussion infra Part II.B.
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million African Americans and eight million Latinos lived in communities with one or more hazardous waste sites.
Communities with a single hazardous waste facility were
found to have twice the percentage of minorities as communities without such a facility (24 percent vs. 12 percent).
Communities with two or more facilities have more than
three times the minority representation than communities
without any such sites (38 percent vs. 12 percent).7
And three of the five largest commercial hazardous waste landfills
are located in communities in which minorities comprise the majority of the population.28

2. Underlying Reasons
Given this empirical evidence, one may legitimately ask the
natural follow-up question: Why is it that minorities receive more of
the burdens? There are several possible contributing factors, some
more benign than others.
As discussed above, 29 patterns of economic development are
one root cause. Under conditions of economic growth unequally distributed among geographic locales, it follows that resultant burdens
and benefits are themselves inequitably doled out to constituencies.
Environmental and health costs are localized: risks increase
with proximity to the source and are borne by those living
nearby, while the benefits are dispersed throughout the
larger society. Communities that host hazardous waste
disposal facilities (importers) receive fewer economic
benefits (jobs) than do communities that generate the waste
(exporters). The people who benefit the most bear the least
burden.30

27. Charles Lee, Toxic Waste and Race in the United States, in RACE AND THE IN-

CIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS, supra note 12, at 14-15 (citing UCC REPORT,
supra note 23).
28. See id. The UCC report also documents the overrepresentation of minorities in
areas with uncontrolled toxic waste sites-presenting potentially greater risks to
those in the area. "[T]hree of every five blacks and Hispanics live in communities
with uncontrolled toxic waste sites. The average minority population is four times
greater in areas with [uncontrolled toxic waste] sites than in communities without
such facilities." Rachel D. Godsil, Note, Remedying Environmental Racism, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 394, 399 (1991) (citing UCC REPORT, supra note 23).
29. See discussions supra Part I.A.1; see also infra Part IV.A.2.
30. Robert D. Bullard, Introduction, in CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM,
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Under a free enterprise system that allows (or even encourages) the
costs of industrial pollution control to be borne by the consumer, the
poor will be affected disproportionately.
With unequal growth comes undesirable consequences, such as
industrial facilities that pollute. The "Not In My Back Yard"
(NIMBY) syndrome often leads to a "Put It In Their Back Yard"
(PITBY) mentality among elected officials and corporate interests
alike, resulting in a move to the path of least resistance: "Put It In
Blacks' Back Yard" (PIIBBY). 32 Such burden-shifting is directly related to a systemic lack of democratic efficacy, as " 'Somewhere Else,
U.S.A.' often ends up being located in poor, powerless, minority
communities" 33 where people of color often face a "double
whammy" of elevated risks and poor health care.3
Seemingly incongruent with discriminatory intent, facility siting decisions may be made on the basis of criteria that, on their face,
may appear to be racially neutral.35 In siting a facility, policymakers
and private sector business interests generally consider the facility's
physical requirements and the costs of siting, constructing, and operating the facility. Factors include a "sufficiently sized plot of land
suitable for building, proximity to roads, water or other transportation networks, proximity to the raw materials or wastes handled by
the facility, proper zoning or compatibility with neighboring land
uses, and availability of labor resources. 3 6 If consistency in applying
racially neutral standards is the practical norm, then how does disproportionate burdening of minorities occur? Observers argue that

supra note 7, at 11.
31. See WENZ, supra note 4, at 1 (crediting Norman J. Faramelli, Ecological Responsibility and Economic Justice, in WESTERN MAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 188 (Ian
G. Barbour ed., 1973)).
32. See Harvey L. White, Hazardous Waste Incineration and Minority Communities, in
RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS, supra note 12, at 134-35. By

extension, PUBBY finds a cousin in P]ILBY--"Put It In Latinos' Back Yard"-or by
the same token, PILNABY, for Native Americans.
33. Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Blackmail in Minority Communities, in RACE
AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAzARDS, supra note 12, at 85.

34. See Bullard, supra note 30, at 11. At the same time, structural discrimination
also means that middle-income Blacks, not just those of low socioeconomic status,
are disproportionately affected. "Institutional barriers limit mobility options of
middle-income and low-income blacks alike and contribute to their concentration in
less desirable (in terms of environmental quality) neighborhoods." ROBERT D.
BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY at xv

(1990).
35. "Race neutrality" in this context assumes that market dynamics-the "invisible
hand"-distribute burdens in a "natural" manner. See generally James S. Freeman &
Rachel D. Godsil, The Question of Risk: Incorporating Community Perceptionsinto Envi-

ronmental Risk Assessments, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 547 (1994).
36. Id. at 551.
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"professional myopia is an important factor explaining the persistence of environmental injustice.
Risk management strategies involve siting facilities in areas of
low population density, which at first glance seems best able to
minimize risk. However, areas of low population density often are
rural and poor." In particular, southern rural areas of low population density often are poor and predominantly Black. In the Southwest, such areas typically have high proportions of Native
Americans and Mexican Americans. Thus, even a facially raceneutral siting decision rule often has a disproportionate impact on
minorities and effectively targets them for environmental injustices. 39
Administrative review processes are themselves non-neutral; in
fact, they may be highly politicized. Regulatory agencies that are
charged with producing environmental impact statements are "not
immune to political influence, particularly in favor of the industries
that they are set up to regulate," and public hearings often are highly
technocratic.40 While "both the corporate or governmental sponsors
of a facility and the agency officials in charge of administrative review are trained in the technical aspects of environmental review,'
citizens' groups often are less informed and thus may be confounded by the review process. In any case, information and
resource costs, together with other collective action problems, are
difficult hurdles to overcome.42

37. Conner Bailey et al., Environmental Justice and the Professional, in ENvIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 37.

38. See Conner Bailey & Charles E. Faupel, Environmentalism& Civil Rights in Sumter County, Alabama, in RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS,
supra note 12, at 150-51. For a general critique of quantitative risk assessment within
the environmental justice frame, see Robert R. Kuehn, The EnvironmentalJustice Implications of QuantitativeRisk Assessment, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 103 (1996).
39. See Bailey et al., supra note 37, at 37; see also Bailey & Faupel, supra note 38, at
150-51 (describing siting arguments centered on a Selma Chalk formation that made
impoverished and Black-majority communities prime candidates for a hazardous
waste facility).
40. Freeman & Godsil, supra note 35, at 555 (citing Clayton P. Gillette & James E.
Krier, Risk, Courts and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1027 (1990)).
41. Freeman & Godsil, supra note 35, at 554-57. And even with access to meaningful information, citizens' views may be less valued by decisionmakers. See Kuehn,
supra note 38, at 131.
42. For example, as two commentators have noted:
To be effective [in organizing and communicating their concerns], citizens
from different classes, backgrounds and professions must come together to
discuss the issues, agree on a common strategy, and take time out from their
regular activities to implement a strategy to counter the small group of experts whose full time job is to get the facility sited and built. The difficulties
inherent in this public organization are particularly acute if the community is
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Labor and capital resources that make an area attractive to a
corporate or industrial interest may not merely be naturally indigenous to a given area; thus, state and local governmental interests are
more than eager to make good on economic incentives designed to
lure facilities. Using eminent domain or buyouts to "relocate" minority or lower-status residents, changing residential to industrial
zoning, or enacting right-to-work laws can be powerful inducements
for corporate interests to locate in areas or communities that may be
disadvantaged by process, outcome, or both.
Are such considerations race-neutral? On their face, perhaps so.
But their impacts are far from evenly distributed by status, race, or
ethnicity. Facially race-neutral locational, zoning, or labor force considerations quickly become suspect when either standards of
invidious intent or disproportionate impact are applied. 43 Minorities
are subject to a "Doctrine of Double Effect,""4 wherein they are
damned by the often-interactive effects of skin color and socioeconomic status. These conditions lend themselves to claims of
disparate impact that are just as legitimately made as those that are
intent-based.

politically disenfranchised, fragmented, or has only minimal representation at
the decisionmaking level.
Freeman & Godsil, supra note 35, at 560 (citing Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier,
Risk, Courts and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1027, 1065-68 (1990)); see also Rachel D.
Godsil & James S. Freeman, Jobs, Trees and Autonomy: The Convergence of Environmental Justice and Community Economic Development, 5 MD. J.CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
25 (1994). Those who wistfully hearken to the model of the New England town
meeting hardly find purchase here; democratic participation and decisionmaking
surely suffer under such conditions. But proponents of relatively unfettered economic growth do not.
43. Many location- or community-specific manifestations of racism have historical
roots in state sponsorship-e.g., the conditions under which communities of color
were segregated or impoverished by policies that facilitated housing covenants and
dual labor markets. Hence, one study finds that "market dynamics also play a very
significant role in creating the uneven distributions of the burdens [locally unwanted
land uses] impose," suggesting that even improved siting processes would not obviate fundamental problems with status quo market dynamics. See Been, LULUs in
Minority Neighborhoods, supra note 23, at 1386-92.
44. The phrase, coined by Professor Wenz, suggests that if an action has two effects, one moral and one immoral, the moral effect wins, and the immoral effect is
ignored-in this instance, economic growth is good, and poverty, not racism, is a
cause of any undesirable outcomes. Hence "[d]efenders of practices that disproportionately disadvantage nonwhites seem to claim, in keeping with the Doctrine of
Double Effect, that racial effects are blameless because they are sought neither as
ends-in-themselves nor as means to reach a desired goal. They are merely predictable
side effects of economic and political practices that disproportionately expose poor
people to toxic substances." Peter S. Wenz, Just Garbage,in FACES OF ENVIRONMENTAL
RAcISM: CONFRONTING ISSUES OF GLOBAL JUSTICE 57, 58 (Laura Westra & Peter S.
Wenz eds., 1995) [hereinafter FAcES OF ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM].
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C. Lack of Inclusion in Traditional Environmental Organizations
Historically, minority participation in mainstream environmental organizations has been limited.45 Why so? Mainstream
environmental groups have been widely accused of frustrating or
failing people of color through "environmental elitism," which may
adopt several guises. For example, "(1) compositional elitism implies
that environmentalists come from privileged class strata, (2) ideological elitism implies that environmental reforms are a subterfuge
for distributing the benefits to environmentalists and costs to
nonenvironmentalists, and (3) impact elitism implies that environmental reforms have regressive distributional impacts."4' Some have
argued that conventional environmentalism "has shifted from a
'participatory' to a 'power' strategy, where the 'core of active environmental movement is focused on litigation, political lobbying, and
technical evaluation rather than on mass mobilization for protest
marches.' ,47 From an environmental justice perspective,
[t]he crux of the problem is that the mainstream environmental movement has not sufficiently addressed the fact
that social inequality and imbalances of social power are at
the heart of environmental degradation, resource depletion, pollution, and
even overpopulation.
The
environmental crisis can simply not be solved effectively
without social justice.48
Without a metafocus on fundamental principles of social justice,
mainstream environmentalists have overlooked certain redistributive interests that may concern people of color more than Whites.
Regardless of the constituencies or issues of concern to people
of color, easy and efficacious collective action is far from a given.
Barriers to minority mobilization around environmental concerns
continue to include (1) limited time and money, (2) lack of access to
technical, medical, and legal expertise, (3) weak political influence,
(4) weak media influence, (5) ideological conflict (over, for example,

45. See, e.g., Dorceta Taylor, Can the Environmental Movement Attract and Maintain
the Support of Minorities? in RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAzARDS,
supra note 12, at 28.
46. BULLARD, supra note 34, at 11 (citing Denton E. Morrison and Riley E. Dunlap,
Environmentalism and Elitism: A Conceptual and Empirical Analysis, 10 ENVTL. MGMT.
581 (1986)) (emphasis omitted).
47. Id. at 1 (quoting ALLAN SCHNAIBERG, THE ENVIRONMENT: FROM SURPLUS TO

SCARCrrY 366-77 (1980)).
48. Robert D. Bullard, Anatomy of Environmental Racism and the Environmental Justice Movement, in CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, supra note 7, at 23.
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environmental preservation versus job creation), and (6) language
barriers.
Yet in recent years, African Americans, Latinos, and Native
Americans have demonstrated strong concern for environmental
issues affecting the communities in which they live." One author
details factors influencing appeal of environmental movements to
minority communities: (1) solidarity, shared values and goals, (2) the
ability to recognize avenues of advocacy, (3) the ability to mobilize
resources (money, expertise, etc.), (4) perception of a problem (e.g.,
"survival" of wildlife, or health and quality of life for humans), and
(5) pre-existing organizations to assist in mobilization.' The presence of such factors has contributed, in recent years, to minorities'
increased interest and ability to bypass mainstream environmental
organizations and strike out on their own in major grassroots mobilizations.

II. THE GOALS AND

PRINCIPLES OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

MOVEMENT

The disproportionate burdens borne by communities of color
rarely have served as red flags for existing environmental
organizations and policymakers. Constrained environmental regulatory and judicial strategies have failed to overcome the effects of
status quo growth politics and institutionalized racism on those
whose lives have been most affected. The environmental justice
movement has arisen as a response to the failings of a pluralistic

49. See Regina Austin & Michael Schill, Black, Brown, Red, and Poisoned, in
UNEQUAL PROTECTION, supra note 1, at 57; see also Lee, supra note 27, at 15-16, 20
(arguing that similar factors may lead to a perception of environmental problems as
"luxury concerns"). On perceived minority infighting over the costs and benefits of
one pollution-producing site, see Keith Schneider, Blacks Fighting Blacks on Planfor
Toxic Dump, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1993, at A12. But the article-and its author-has
been roundly criticized for its reportage. See Freeman & Godsil, supra note 35, at 547
n.2.
50. See, e.g., BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE, supra note 34, at 93 (discussing empirical
evidence from surveys of nine communities confronted with a major problem involving an industrial facility located in a residential area demonstrating a decided proenvironmental bias among Blacks--overall, two-thirds of the households surveyed
rated concern for the environment as more important than jobs).
51. See Taylor, supra note 45, at 37, 39. Taylor's last point mirrors Morris' analysis
of the Civil Rights Movement, wherein the emergence and sustenance of an outgroup
movement depends on whether the group possesses (1) certain basic indigenous
resources, (2) social activists with strong ties to mass-based indigenous institutions,
and (3) tactics and strategies that can be effectively employed against a system of
domination. See MORRIS, supra note 11, at 282.
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policy process that has marginalized the voices of those in need of
access and opportunity.
A. Environmental Justice Defined
Although the environmental justice movement is diverse in
constituencies, strategies, and desired outcomes, 2 scholars and activists have agreed on some basic, overarching principles. The logical
flow from conceptions of environmental racism" to those of environmental justice incorporates a holistic approach to causation and
solutions. Whether spiritually rooted' or situated firmly in political
economy,5 definitions of environmental justice cogently demonstrate the interrelatedness of policymakers and policy outcomes.
Much of the legal literature on environmental remedies follows
a narrow conception of environmental racism that allows for the
equation of equitable application of the laws with environmental
justice. 56 Under such a perspective, environmental equity, which
"refers to the equal protection of environmental laws ...[that]
should be enforced equally to ensure the proper siting, clean up of
hazardous wastes, and the effective regulation of industrial pollution, regardless of the racial and economic composition of the community,5 s7 differs from environmental justice in both worldview and
scope. While equal protection of the laws is nothing to sneeze at, and
using equity concerns to make the connections between environmentalism and economic growth may yield significant results, 8

52. The catch-all phrase "the environmental movement" often is bandied about in
descriptive accounts of environmentalism or environmentalists. Such a phrase may
be criticized as coming dangerously close to reifying a monolithic view of what
would be characterized more appropriately as distinct and varied "environmental
movements" over time, as well as based on activists, strategies, and constituents. See,
e.g., Taylor, supra note 45, at 28-54 (providing rough historical sketches of changing
environmental movements). Nonetheless, acknowledging the diversity of the movement or even its lack of cohesiveness should not preclude one from identifying
certain characteristics of "new" grassroots minority involvement that draw upon
empirical instances of mobilization. See, e.g., Bullard, supra note 48, at 27-38
(discussing case studies of nine environmentally threatened communities of color
that formed grassroots groups).
53. See discussion supra Part I.
54. See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 1, at 274-75 (listing the seventeen "Principles of
Environmental Justice" from the First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit, held in Washington, D.C., in October 1991, which affirm the
"sacredness of Mother Earth").
55. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra note 7; RACE AND THE INCIDENCE

OF ENVIRONMENTAL

HAZARDS, supra note 12; UNEQUAL PROTECTION, supra note

1.

56. See, e.g., Gareis-Smith, supra note 10, at 57.
57. Bryant, supra note 13, at 5-6.
58. See, e.g., Roger H. Bezdek, The Net Impact of EnvironmentalProtection on Jobs and
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environmental equity lends itself to status quo conceptions of
resource allocation. 9
Many mainstream environmental organizations, while wellintentioned, have fallen into traditional pluralistic assumptions concerning the efficacy of interest groups. Their focus on environmental
lawmaking and regulation, together with enforcement procedures
that rely on litigation, have provided only incremental changes in
the ways that the public and private sectors interact. Perhaps more
importantly, conventional tactics surrounding environmental regulation and enforcement lack a strategic focus on many methods of
prevention that could obviate continued disparate impact on communities of color.
Environmental justice broadens the scope of discourse on
policymaking, implementation, and outcomes by incorporating
equity as a subset of larger concerns. "It refers to those cultural
norms and values, rules, regulations, behaviors, policies, and
decisions to support sustainable communities, where people can
interact with confidence that their environment is safe, nurturing,
and productive."' Situating social justice firmly within a politicaleconomic framework, "[e]nvironmental justice is supported by
decent paying and safe jobs; quality schools and recreation; decent
housing and adequate health care; democratic decision-making and
personal empowerment; and communities free of violence, drugs,
and poverty."'"
The movement attempts to return elements of democratic
control over technocratic decisionmaking processes, with their
concomitant emphasis on scientific risk analysis and management.62
The environmental justice movement addresses "environmental
enforcement, compliance, policy formulation, and decisionmaking"
while defining "environment in very broad terms, as the places
where people live, work, and play.' The movement thus propels
high-level, often scientifically esoteric policy decisionmaking
the Economy, in ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 5 (arguing generally that
equity protection can have positive economic impacts on diverse groups).
59. See, e.g., BULLARD, supra note 34, at 90-91 (arguing that financial compensation
for risks incurred from industrial siting decisions often is used as a criterion for environmental "equity").
60. Bryant, supra note 13, at 6.
61. Id.
62. At least one commentator has observed that "quantitative risk assessment
appears to reinforce, if not enhance, the special access and influence that powerful
interest groups have on environmental agency decisionmaking." Kuehn, supra note
38, at 103, 132; see also FIORINO, supra note 5. For a recent and readable discussion of
the types of risk assessment currently employed, see John H. Cushman, Jr., E.P.A.
Plans Radical Change in Calculationof Cancer Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1996, at Al.
63. Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Justicefor All, in UNEQUAL PROTECTION, supra
note 1, at 11.
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processes into the public arena, where a two-way discursive flow
can allow citizens to speak to those who would represent them.
Environmental justice thus incorporates, as an ultimate goal, making
environmental protection more democratic" by bringing to the fore
the important normative links between politics and ethics.
Specifically, Professor Bullard describes five basic goals of an
environmental justice framework: (1) guaranteeing the right of all
individuals to be protected from environmental degradation, (2) incorporating a public health model of prevention that obviates threats
before harms occur, (3) shifting the burden of proof to polluters to
show no discrimination against "protected" classes, (4) allowing for
disparate impact (rather than discriminatory intent) analysis to infer
discrimination, and (5) redressing disproportionate risk burdens and
existing inequities through targeted resources and policies 6 These
goals are to be played out at the local, state, and national levels, and
involve active petitioning, often initiated at the grassroots, of diverse
legislative, judicial, and executive bodies.
B. Environmental Justice Described
1. The Movement Is Born
Social movements do not become movements overnight, nor are
they formed without considerable struggle. 6 The environmental justice movement has been precipitated by the status of people of color
as outsiders in dominant society. While environmentalists mobilize
for a variety of reasons that include both psychological and structural factors, Professor Bullard argues that "the issues that are most
likely to attract the interests of black community residents are those
that have been couched in a civil rights or equity framework," focusing on inequality or distributional impacts and favoring social and
political "underdogs."6 7
The beginnings of national awareness of the environmental justice movement may be traced to two main catalysts: a 1982
grassroots protest against a landfill in Warren County, North Carolina, and a 1987 study of hazardous waste sites funded by the United
Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice (UCC Commission).

64. See id.
65. See id. at 10; see also Robert D. Bullard, Decision Making, in FACES OF ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, supra note 44, at 9.
66. See generally MORRIS, supra note 11 (detailing the evolution of the Civil Rights

Movement).
67. BuLLARD, supra note 34, at 14.
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In 1982, Warren County residents mobilized against the state's
plan to dispose of soil laden with polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB)
which had been illegally dumped along state highways in a landfill
near Afton, North Carolina. Seeking assistance from the Reverend
Leon White, a veteran of civil rights struggles in the South, protesters soon engaged in a widespread campaign of non-violent civil
disobedience. Although unsuccessful in preventing the siting of the
PCB landfill, this series of protests was the first documented African
American grassroots environmental justice movement to focus national attention on such a problem, instigating a subsequent
investigation of hazardous waste sites by the United States General
Accounting Officei 8
In 1987, the UCC Commission, long active in social advocacy
causes, released the first comprehensive national study linking
demographic patterns and hazardous waste sites.69 In addition to its
striking findings concerning the disproportionate numbers of impoverished people of color living near hazardous waste sites, 0 Dr.
Benjamin F. Chavis, Jr., Executive Director of the UCC Commission
at the time of the study, coined the phrase "environmental racism,"
giving name to the problem.71
These early impetuses for environmental justice catalyzed a
nascent movement by providing both voice and examples of strategy
and information to those who could use them. The movement acquired further legitimacy from avenues parallel to the original
Warren County protest and the UCC Commission's study: studies of
disproportionate impacts on members of lower-status groups soon
were buttressed by grassroots protests by those very groups.
2. The Movement Expands
"Like anybody else, people of color are distressed by accidental
toxic spills, explosions, and inexplicable patterns of miscarriages and
cancers, and they are beginning to fight back .. .."72 Employing

conventional and unconventional political strategies such as petitions and non-violent protests," legal strategies through legislative
lobbying, administrative dispute mediation, 74 and litigation using

68.
69.
70.
71.

See Lee, supra note 27, at 12; see also Godsil, supra note 28, at 394.
UCC REPORT, supra note 23.
See Lee, supra note 27, at 14-15.
See Godsil, supra note 28, at 395.

72. Austin & Schill, supra note 49, at 57.
73. See Bullard, supra note 48.

74. See Gerald Torres, Environmental Burdens and DemocraticJustice, 21 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 431 (1994) (arguing for administrative strategies rather than relying solely
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environmental and civil rights claims,m the environmental justice
movement has expanded dramatically within the span of a few short
years.
Perhaps the biggest surprise for mainstream environmentalists,
industrial and corporate interests, and local governments lies with
the rapidity and organizational skills with which numerous and
widely varied grassroots interests have mobilized. Current assessments find that the sector of the environmental movement with the
fastest growth is grassroots groups in communities of color organized around diverse issues of "waste-facility siting, lead
contamination, pesticides, water and air pollution, native selfgovernment, nuclear testing, and workplace safety., 76 By 1991, there
were more than 7,000 such environmental justice groups nationwide .7
Increasingly, these groups are communicating their strategies
and experiences to one another,78 as well as linking themselves to
resources that are already in place. Preexisting indigenous leaders,
resources, and institutions are important keys to grassroots mobilization, facilitating, for example, "piggybacking the toxics issue onto
the local social action agendas, including neighborhood associations,
civic clubs, political groups, and labor unions."79
One author emphasizes several directions of focus for grassroots environmental groups: (1) pursue issues pertinent to poor
communities, (2) strive for minority groups rather than minority
members of White groups, (3) put minorities on an equal level with
Whites to avoid minority members solely following White directives
and ideology, (4) decline White involvement if necessary, (5) achieve
empowerment through organization, and (6) define a new environmental agenda to address local issues and minority concerns.8o
Professor Bullard suggests some additional underlying imperatives
for grassroots minority movements: (1) focus on equity and the
urban industrial complex, (2) challenge the mainstream environmental movement for its conservative tactics but not its goals, (3)
emphasize the needs of the community and workplace as primary
agenda items, (4) use indigenous self-taught "experts" in citizen
lawsuits instead of relying on legislation and lobbying, (5) adopt a
on litigation).
75. See infra Part III.
76. Bullard, supra note 48, at 25.
77. See Dorceta Taylor, Environmentalism and the Politics of Inclusion, in CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, supra note 7, at 53, 54.
78. See Bullard, supra note 48, at 38.
79. BULLARD, supra note 34, at 98; see also Bullard, supra note 48, at 38. On the
parallel importance of indigenous resources to the Civil Rights Movement, see
MORRIS, supra note 11, at 278.
80. See Taylor, supra note 45, at 41-42.
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"populist" stance on environmental issues relying on active
grassroots members rather than dues-payers from mailing lists, and
(6) embrace a democratic ideology related to the Civil Rights and
Women's Movements.8
Given these characteristics and goals, it is not difficult to argue
that "grassroots activists have thus been the most influential activists
in placing equity and social justice issues onto the larger environmental agenda and democratizing and diversifying the movement as
a whole."82 From the perspective of the mainstream environmental
movement, "diversification makes good economic and political
sense for [its] long-range survival," as it provides broadened perspectives and mirrors the demographic and institutional
diversification of the country.'
Situating the various goals and strategies of grassroots movements within an analytic framework allows for assessment and
translation of both successes and failures to new situations. While
successes are varied and storied, the failings of the environmental
movement paradoxically may be linked to the kinds of strategies it
employs. A forward-looking philosophical emphasis on prevention
permeates the movement,84 but a practical reliance on backwardlooking strategies is often the reality. Corporate and industrial interests, often in conjunction with local governmental institutions,
continue to have the upper hand in determining the nature of environmental discourse. The industrial siting process, for example, is
highly preemptive of input,85 as public "hearings often are held late
in a decision process, after options have been narrowed and the important choices have been made."'M Grassroots mobilization often
comes at the back end of the deal, politically disadvantaging the already disadvantaged and marginalized. Moreover, "hearings have
come to be equated with opposition, which causes many agency officials to look on them with disdain and citizen groups to see them
as a last stage for vetoing proposals and preparing for lawsuits. 87
The litigation process is also backward-looking, seeking
injunctive relief or redress for siting decisions already made, or
worse, harms already incurred. Yet diverse tactics are crucial to the
success of the environmental justice movement. Recent develop-

81. See BULLARD, supra note 34, at 104 (citing Robert Gottlieb & Helen Ingram, The
New Environmentalists,THE PROGRESSIVE, Aug. 1988, at 14).
82. Bullard, supra note 48, at 39.
83. BULLARD, supra note 34, at 110.
84. See, e.g., Bryant, supra note 13, at 6; Bullard, supra note 63, at 9-10.
85. See Freeman & Godsil, supra note 35, at 551-62.
86. FIORINO, supra note 5, at 96.

87. Id.
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ments indicate an increasing emphasis on one litigative strategy:
environmental racism claims under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act,'s the apparent strategy du jour of the environmental justice
movement and the focus of this Article.
III. THE ROLE OF CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION WITHIN THE
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT

A. Equal ProtectionClaims
Litigation based on environmental racism often has relied on
the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 9 Although appropriate in theory-after all, environmental racism charges, at least
in part, that people of color are not afforded equal protection of the
laws-the litigation was uniformly unsuccessful, due to the standard
of proof applied to equal protection claims. 90
The Supreme Court has set forth a stringent standard of proof
in cases involving equal protection claims. In Washington v. Davis,9'
the plaintiffs challenged a police training admission test as discriminatory under the Equal Protection Clause. Black applicants failed the
test, which purported to measure verbal ability, vocabulary, and
reading comprehension,9 four times as often as White applicants. 9
The Court held that although disparate impact was not irrelevant, a
valid equal protection claim requires proof of discriminatory intent
or purpose. To hold otherwise, the Court reasoned, could invalidate "a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and
licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and to
the average black than to the more affluent white. 9 5
In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation, the Court applied the Washington v. Davis

88. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d (West 1994).
89. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1.
90. See Torres, supra note 74, at 437 ("The failures owe less to the merits of the
claims than to the levels of proof required to prevail in cases of alleged intentional
discrimination.").
91. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
92. See id. at 235.
93. See id. at 237.
94. See id. at 242 ("Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole
touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution.").
95. See id. at 248 (citation omitted).
96. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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standard to governmental decisions and identified five relevant factors in determining whether an action was motivated by intentional
race discrimination: (1) the effect of the official action, (2) the historical background of the decision, (3) the specific sequence of events
leading up to the challenged decision, (4) departures from normal
procedures, and (5) the administrative history of the decision.9 Additionally, the Court opined that even if the plaintiff were able to
prove purposeful discrimination, the government would have the
opportunity to show that "the same decision would have resulted
even had the impermissible purpose not been considered."9' Thus,
the discrimination must not only be intentional, but prejudicial.
The standard of intentional discrimination is a difficult one for
any plaintiff to meet. Several factors further decrease the likelihood
of a court finding purposeful discrimination in the environmental
context. First, siting decisions often are based on facially neutral factors, such as economic concerns or the environmental conditions of
an area." Second, the ill effects of the environment are less apparent
than other harms.1 ° Third, siting decisions appear to present a zerosum problem to the courts: there will be winners as well as losers
because the land use must be sited somewhere.' Finally, proving
the discrimination in environmental issues often requires complicated statistical analysis, not a strong suit for many judges and
attorneys. 0 2 Two cases, Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corporation'°3 and R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay,' 4 illustrate the particular difficulty
of showing discriminatory intent in the context of environmental
racism.
In Bean, the plaintiffs challenged the site selection for a solid
waste facility as racially discriminatory. The approved site was located in a neighborhood that was eighty-two percent Black and
within 1700 feet of a predominantly Black high school. In the context
of a motion for a preliminary injunction,' 5 the court found that the
97. See id.
at 266-68.

98. See id. at 270-71 n.2.
99. See discussion supra Part I.B.

100.
101.
102.
courts'

See Torres, supra note 74, at 444-45.
See id. at 444.
See id. With regard to the third factor, commentators have distinguished
relative willingness to find discriminatory intent in the context of municipal

services on the basis that "everyone wins" when the result is simply extending a
good to more people. "[A]s a practical matter, while the judiciary is willing to find
for plaintiffs in cases that involve the provision of a social 'good,' the courts seem
reluctant to make decisions regarding the placement of a social 'bad' like a LULU."
Fisher, supra note 10, at 331.

103. 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
104. 768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991), aff'd, 977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1992).
105. To be entitled to a preliminary injunction, a party must show, among other
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plaintiffs likely would not be able to prove that the permit decision
had been motivated by purposeful racial discrimination. The court
was persuaded that the site selection was "unfortunate and insensitive," but determined that the plaintiffs' evidence
simply did not
01 6
meet the standard of intentional discrimination.
Similarly, in R.I.S.E., the court was persuaded that the
placement of landfills (one of which the court termed "an
environmental disaster") in two counties in Virginia "from 1969 to
10 7
the present has had a disproportionate impact on black residents."
Nevertheless, the court concluded that the plaintiffs' evidence was
insufficient to show discriminatory intent: "[Tihe Equal Protection
Clause does not impose an affirmative duty to equalize the impact of
official decisions on different racial groups. Rather, it merely
prohibits government officials from intentionally discriminating on
the basis of race."' 8 "As Bean and R.I.S.E. illustrate, the burden to
establish racially discriminatory purpose or intent, as a legal matter,
is tremendous, particularly when the decisions at issue are governmental decisions, as they often are in the environmental context."'°9
B. Title VI
Recently, the legal academia has counseled environmental justice activists to turn to litigation under Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, " 0 which prohibits discrimination in federally funded
programs, as an alternative to equal protection claims."' This strategy, endorsed by the Clinton Administration, 2 was intended to
things, that it is likely to succeed on the merits of its claim. Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 676
(citing Canal Auth. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1974)).

106. Id. at 680.
107. R.I.S.E., 768 F. Supp. at 1149.

108. Id. at 1150.
109. Torres, supra note 74, at 442; see also Austin & Schill, supra note 49, at 67;
Bullard, supra note 65, at 18-20; Fisher, supra note 10, at 285; Godsil, supra note 28, at
413-16 (providing a detailed discussion of Bean).
110. "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to

discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d (West 1994).
111. For a discussion of the three legal options available under Title VI (suing the

discriminatory recipient of federal funds, suing the funding agency, or filing a complaint through the funding agency's administrative procedures), see Colopy, supra
note 10, at 156-88.

112. In 1994, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,898, titled "Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income

Populations," which directed federal agencies to consider environmental justice issues. Exec. Order 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1995), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.A. § 4321 (West
1994); see also Clarice E. Gaylord & Elizabeth Bell, Environmental Justice: A National

Priority,in FACES OF ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, supra note 44. The EPA, as a political
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avoid the pitfall of the Equal Protection Clause's intentionaldiscrimination burden of proof and thus remedy environmental racism injuries that exist irrespective of motive.
Title VI requires only a showing of disparate impact,' 3 a much
less onerous burden of proof than discriminatory intent. Initially, a
Title VI plaintiff must show the disparate impact a particular action
would have on a community of color."4 In the environmental context, a plaintiff might show, as in Bean, that a siting decision would
have a disparate impact on Blacks, regardless of racial animus. After
the plaintiff has established this prima facie case, the burden shifts to
the defendant to demonstrate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason
for the action."' Once the defendant has done so, the burden shifts
back to the plaintiff to show that the proffered justification is pretextual."6 Thus, Title VI prohibits only unjustified disparate impacts. 7
Upon proving disparate impact under the evidentiary standard
outlined above, a Title VI plaintiff is entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief to "identify the violation and enjoin its continuance."" 8
If she is successful in proving discriminatory intent, compensatory

body, relates its tasks to its mission. Before Clinton's executive order, the EPA was
closed to addressing civil rights violations. Under the current administration, it may
be more open to charges of environmental racism than the traditionally conservative
judiciary. See Fisher, supra note 10, at 313. Yet there is limited (visible) evidence that
this has occurred. On the efficiency of executive orders in pursuing environmental
justice, see Sebastian C. Pugliese III, Environmental Justice: Lowering Barriersto Participation, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 1177 (1995) (arguing that executive orders efficiently
channel statistical information to decisionmakers).
113. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983). For a discussion of the Court's complicated opinion and its implications, see Colopy, supra
note 10, at 159.
114. See, e.g., Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1407 (11th
Cir. 1993).
115. See id.
116. See id. But see Sidney D. Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI: Defending Health Care
Discrimination-It Shouldn't Be So Easy, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 939, 971-75 (1990)
(arguing that Title VII's less strict regulation of employers should not be applied to
Title VI's standards because Title VI regulates public spending rather than the private sphere of employment); Colopy, supra note 10, at 163 (arguing that the disparate
impact analysis of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 should be applied as the appropriate
prima facie standard in Title VI cases).
117. See, e.g., Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against 1-670 v. Damian, 608 F.
Supp. 110, 127 (S.D. Ohio 1984) ("Defendants are not per se prohibited from locating a
highway where it will have differential impacts upon minorities. Rather, Title VI
prohibits taking actions with differential impacts without adequate justification.").
118. GuardiansAss 'n, 463 U.S. at 596.
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relief in the form of money damages is also available."9 Prevailing
plaintiffs also are entitled to reasonable attorney fees.1u
Title VI requires federal funding before a violation may be
found, 2' thus covering all federal agencies as well as state and local
agencies receiving federal funding. As most federal environmental
laws provide funding for state programs, which in turn extend assistance to local agencies, this limitation generally will be met.'2 Title
VI will apply to an entire agency if even one part of the agency "is
extended Federal financial assistance."'a Thus, most state and local
agencies likely are subject to Title VI.

119. See, e.g., Eastman v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst., 939 F.2d 204, 206-07 (4th Cir.
1991) (holding that "intentional discrimination is a prerequisite to an award of any
sort of 'compensatory damages' to a private litigant in a Title VI case" under Guardians Ass 'n).
120. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988(b) (West 1994).
121. Title VI prohibits discrimination in "any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d (West 1994).
122. A recent EPA report indicates that federal funding constitutes a large percentage of state budgets for air, water, and hazardous waste programs. U.S. ENVrL.
PROTECTION AGENCY,

A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE PuBLIC COSTS OF ENvI-

RONMENTAL PROTECTION: 1981-2000, at 9 (1988).
123. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d-4a. Section 2000d-4a provides:
For the purposes of this subchapter, the term "program or activity" and the
term "program" mean all of the operations of(1)(A) a department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or of a local government; or
(B) the entity of such State or local government that distributes such assistance and each such department or agency (and each other State or local
government entity) to which the assistance is extended, in the case of assistance to a State or local government;
(2)(A) a college, university, or other postsecondary institution, or a public
system of higher education; or
(B) a local educational agency.. ., system of vocational education, or other
school system;
(3)(A) an entire corporation, partnership, or other private organization, or
an entire sole proprietorship(i) if assistance is extended to such corporation, partnership, private
organization, or sole proprietorship as a whole; or
(ii) which is principally engaged in the business of providing education, health care, housing, social services, or parks and recreation; or
(B) the entire plant or other comparable, geographically separate facility to
which Federal financial assistance is extended, in the case of any other
corporation, partnership, private organization, or sole proprietorship; or
(4) any other entity which is established by two or more of the entities described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3);
any part of which is extended Federal financial assistance.
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In 1994, activist and attorney Luke W. Cole examined the seventeen Title VI complaints filed with the EPA between September 1993
and September 1994.124 He noted that

[i]nterestingly, few of the complaints have emerged from
broad-based, local organizing efforts against environmental racism, and even fewer were brought selfconsciously as part of the environmental justice movement.
Many complaints, at least a third of all complaints filed
thus far, appear to be filed by disgruntled individuals expressing frustration with a local agency. This is not to
discount the efforts and discriminatory situations faced by
the individuals or ad hoc groups, but instead to demonstrate that the environmental justice movement, as a
movement, has yet to invest a serious amount of energy in
the Title VI avenue.125
Similarly, case law regarding Title VI challenges to environmental
impacts remains sparse.126
Nevertheless, environmental litigation under Title VI has been
touted by the legal academia as a magic bullet for the environmental
justice movement.'27 Although this almost uniform endorsement has
not been without criticism, its drawbacks have been presumed or
identified only generally rather than with a particular eye toward
the forces which have given rise to and shaped the environmental

124. See Luke W. Cole, Civil Rights, Environmental Justice and the EPA, 9 J. ENVTL. L.
& LrrIG. 309 (1994).
125. Id. at 325 (footnotes omitted). Cole made several observations regarding procedural aspects of administrative complaints under Title VI, including that as there are
no enforceable time limits for the EPA to take action, it could take years until a complaint is resolved; because a Title VI complaint potentially jeopardizes a state or local
agency's federal funding, it is taken seriously; as with other civil rights laws, Whites
also are filing complaints under Title VI; and that it appears that if a complaint is
timely and involves a federally funded agency, the EPA will accept it for investigation. See id. at 387-89.
126. See Luke W. Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation: Another Stone in David's
Sling, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 523, 532-34 (1994) (noting that "environmental justice
cases have relied on the regulations implementing Title VI, rather than the statute
itself," and that one such case, which challenged a freeway siting, represented "one
of [the environmental justice movement's] only Title VI legal victories thus far");
Michael Janofsky, Suit Says Racial Bias Led to the Clustering of Waste-Processing Sites,
N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1996, at A13 (stating that there have been "perhaps only three
instances" of environmental suits against states under the Civil Rights Act). But see
Living on Earth (NPR radio broadcast, July 20, 1996) (reporting that the Chester,
Pennsylvania, case is being "closely watched" by other environmental justice organizations).
127. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 10.
128. See infra Parts IV.C.2 and IV.C.3.

Michigan Journal of Race & Law

[VOL. 2:1

justice movement. This Article situates the legal scholarship
endorsing Title VI litigation within the broader picture of the
environmental justice movement and political economy.
IV. RESITUATING TITLE VI WITHIN POLITICAL ECONOMY

A central insight of political-economic analysis is the complex
interaction between public and private interests.'29 Local governing
bodies are guided and constrained by economic concerns that cannot
be analytically distinguished from political processes.30 Politicaleconomic analysis yields a critical perspective on societal arrange-31
ments that privilege certain segments and disadvantage others.
Litigation, rooted in legal institutions that are predisposed toward
the status quo, operates in the context of dove-tailed political and
economic processes that produced both the issue to be resolved and
the means to attempt its resolution. Title VI litigative strategies, as
well as the environmental justice movement as a whole, face constant barriers and variable contexts that shape their efficacy. After
discussing political-economic factors that frame the movement, this
Part details specific benefits and limitations of Title VI litigation.
A. Constants
1. Structural and Institutional Racism
Disproportionate impacts will result regardless of the intent
behind public or private actions, if discrimination remains pervasive
within structural or institutional contexts. Hence, as with other legal
or policy-oriented outcomes, the general causes of environmental
129. See TODD SWANSTROM, THE CRISIS OF GROWTH POLITICS: CLEVELAND,
KUCINICH, AND THE CHALLENGE OF URBAN POPULISM 33 (1985) ("[Wlhile the economic environment largely determines the size and shape of the public sector, the
economic environment is in turn shaped by the policies of government.") (emphasis
omitted). For a brief and readable synopsis of the science of political economy, see
John H. Moore, Political Economy in Anthropology, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS 3-15 (John H. Moore ed., 1993) (acknowledging the field's
interdisciplinary nature). For a discussion of urban political economy acknowledging
its theoretical roots, see Norman I. Fainstein & Susan S. Fainstein, Restoration and
Struggle: Urban Policy and Social Forces, in URBAN POLICY UNDER CAPITALISM 9

(Norman I. Fainstein & Susan S. Fainstein eds., 1982).
130. See generally SWANSTROM, supra note 129; see also CLARENCE N. STONE, REGIME
POLITICS: GOVERNING ATLANTA, 1946-1988 (1989) (providing historically rooted political-economic analysis of a major southern city); THE POLITICS OF URBAN

DEVELOPMENT (Clarence N. Stone & Heywood T. Sanders eds., 1987) (linking politics
and economics in a series of case studies).
131. See generally THE POLITICS OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 130.
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inequities are racism and the marginalized economic and political
power of minorities. 3 2 Yet in the minds of many policymakers, the
onus is on minorities to engage in collective action in order to overcome such systemic biases. Mobilization has become increasingly
frequent and efficacious,'3 but minorities still face a legacy of exclusion from mainstream environmental groups.TM Minorities continue
to suffer disproportionate levels of social inequities, but are expected
to press their claims through methods (collective action, interest
groups, litigation) that may remain relatively inaccessible or infeasible. Additional possible explanations for the lack of minority
participation in environmental policy include (1) deliberate racial
stereotyping, (2) less overall interest in environmental issues, (3)
greater concern for economic issues, (4) historical exclusion leading
to lessened concern for parks or other "White" preservation issues,
and (5) expenditures of limited political resources on issues perceived to be more pressing (such as housing or entitlement
policies).36
Regardless of the ways in which discrimination is manifested,
under prevailing conditions wherein "'political and economic
power are key factors which influence the spatial distribution of
residential amenities and disamenities,' " and "[ejnvironmental
37
health risks are inextricably linked to political economy of place,'
disparate impact analysis is more than appropriate-it is imperative.
2. Growth Imperatives: "Progress" Trumps
Environmental Concerns
Across the land, historical emphasis on economic growth fueled
by economic boosters and growth machines 38 has led to the
"[m]odern-day [glood [b]usiness [c]limate,', 39 with its concomitant

132. Lazarus, supra note 10, at 822.
133. See discussion supra Part II.
134. See discussion supra Part I.C.
135. See discussion supra Part I.C (discussing "environmental elitism" of mainstream environmental groups).
136. See Lazarus, supra note 10, at 826 ("These vestiges [of past discrimination]
effectively deny minorities the autonomy to choose, either by purchase or through
the ballot, the level of environmental quality that they will enjoy or the amount of

pollution that they will tolerate.").
137. Bunyan Bryant & Paul Mohai, Introduction, in RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS, supra note 12, at 7 (quoting Robert Bullard & Beverly
Wright, Environmentalism and the Politics of Equity: Emergent Trends in the Black Community, MID-AM. REV. SOC., Winter 1987, at 21).
138. See discussion supra Part I.A.
139. LOGAN & MOLOTCH, supra note 16, at 57 (noting that "[tihe jockeying for ca-
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"celebration of local growth [that] continues to be a theme in the culture of localities."'
While local government's concern with
facilitating growth is not its only function, "[tihe growth ethic pervades virtually all aspects of local life." 14' Growth politics may be
linked to decidedly unequal distribution patterns that disproportionately and negatively impact minorities; policymakers long ago
should have disabused themselves of the notion that growth has
concrete and identifiable benefits for everyone within a city's
boundaries. 42 Although perhaps including some calculations of
winners and losers, economic growth and development are seen as
having ultimately positive effects for the polity and its members.43
3. Incremental Nature of Policy Changes and Litigation
The environmental justice movement, whether manifested in
localized grassroots mobilizations or engaged in federal litigative
strategies, will continue to run up against the constraints imposed by
the incremental nature of policy changes and litigation. Policymaking rarely is revolutionary.'" Among national political bodies and
agencies, incrementalism prevails. When Congress is in session,
policy initiatives (major or minor) are subject to committee markup
sessions, contentious floor debate, interest group pressures, and political posturing that ultimately mute (or moot) many legislative
outcomes. Furthermore, "[m]aking policy in the executive branch is
as byzantine and complex as it is in Congress. , 45 At the agency level,
nals, railroads, and arsenals of the previous century has given way in this one to
more complex and subtle efforts to manipulate space and redistribute rents").
140. Id. at 52-63.
141. Id. at 13.
142. See generally THE POUTICS OF URBAN DEvELOPMENT, supra note 130 (including
a series of empirically rooted essays demonstrating the flaws in assuming universal
benefits from economic growth and showing differential and often negative impacts
on minorities in urban environments).
143. The dynamic admittedly is complex and contingent, as "growth pressures
must be filtered through local political systems with particular rules, power arrangements, and perceptions of the governmental market place." SWANSTROM, supra
note 129, at 33.
144. Witness the 1994 "Republican Revolution," which many (regardless of where
they stand on the partisan or ideological continuum) acknowledge stalled in the face
of traditional policymaking considerations and institutional blockages.
145. FIORINO, supra note 5, at 70. As Fiorino further explains:
Congress consists of a collection of specialized committees and subcommittees, a diversity of individuals seeking to do good for the environment or do
well in their home districts, and a fragmented oversight process that pulls an
agency first one way and then another. The executive apparatus is just as
complex. As a technical matter, Congress delegates authority to the administrator to act to protect the environment. But administrators are selected by the
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for example, Professor Daniel Fiorino distinguishes five institutional
perspectives within the EPA: program, policy, legal, research, and
regional.'" Such institutional tensions are to some degree
"deliberately built into the structure of EPA and most large policy
making agencies. Whether consciously or not, most agencies incorporate a degree of multiple advocacy in their designs ....

[The]

EPA's internal tensions reflect the checks and balances present in the
American political system."' 47 Such tensions may fail to provide for
crucial access by outsider groups; they strongly bias agencies and
policymaking bodies toward technocratic professionalized recommendations that reinforce status quo assumptions. Burdens and
environmental
justice concerns may remain externalized from such a
148
process.

While some decry judicial activism and reputed "policymaking"
by the judicial branch, such claims are overstated.
[Federal judges] are powerful, and they can greatly influence agency policies and priorities, but they are
constrained by elaborate procedural rules and subject to
oversight themselves through the appeals process. They
decide issues in the context of a highly structured, adversarial process, and they can act only when litigants bring
cases to them for decisions. 9
The judiciary is bound by the structural limitations of its powers and
jurisdiction.
The environmental justice movement faces these constant
constraints on efficacious action. Insurgency often is channeled into
institutions that mute its potential to alter the manner in which
policymaking and policy outcomes play out. The incremental nature
of policy changes thus impacts the lives of real people in ways that
often are forgotten by those in a position to act on behalf of those in
need." °
president and depend on the White House for political and budgetary support, not to mention their jobs. Nor is the White House content to leave as
vital an issue as the environment (and thus the economy, growth, and other
social ends) to an agency acting under the direction of Congress.
Id. at 69-70.
146. See id. at 45-47.
147. Id. at 47.
148. Hence, the EPA's increasing reliance on quantitative risk assessment, see, e.g.,
Cushman, supra note 62, may prove to be more harmful to minorities, as
"[q]uantitative risk assessment's reduction of pollution-related disease and death to
mere statistics stands in stark contrast to environmental justice's concern with equity
and the political and human aspects of pollution." Kuehn, supra note 38, at 107.
149. FIORINO, supra note 5, at 80.
150. One observer trenchantly makes the link:
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B. The Contingentand Variable Nature
of the Political-EconomicClimate
Other political-economic factors influence the potential for
headway toward the environmental justice movement's objectives.
Such components are contingent and variable, framing the movement's political efficacy.
1. Minority Outgroups and Organizational Structure
Local grassroots mobilization is conditional. Factors include
such regional characteristics as a community's racial composition
and the historical nature of race relations. Can, for example, prior
interactions among people of color and Whites be characterized as
confrontational or quiescent, antagonistic or productive? Are there
legitimate opportunities for minority voices to be heard in electoral
and governmental settings, via multiracial coalitions or otherwise?
Are interactions mediated by institutions, or do they occur primarily
on an ad hoc basis?"'l Related to a region's historical character is the
question of prior claims on social goods. Are there preexisting cleavage issues around which struggle has created interracial wedges?
Potential intraracial divisions also may be present. In the pro-growth
South (as in the rest of the country), minorities are far from monolithic in their methods of evaluating the importance of economic
growth and empowerment versus environmental degradation and
concomitant decreased life opportunities. Evidence of these sometimes competing and contradictory factors is seen in Sumter County,
Alabama, where observers have found that
[1local controversy surrounding operation of the nation's
largest hazardous waste landfill to date has been dissipated by pre-existing struggles for black empowerment,
control over education policy, and efforts to boost a flagging economy. In the context of a racially divided
Although the federal government has responded to claims of environmental
inequity, its response has centered around gathering and studying data on the
characteristics of communities alleging environmental inequities to determine
the extent of the problem. Proving that a problem exists is an appropriate
governmental task; however, the government's failure to do more leaves victims living with the negative health and environmental impacts of having an
unwanted hazardous facility in their neighborhood.
Serena M. Williams, The Anticipatory Nuisance Doctrine: One Common Law Theory for
Use in Environmental Justice Cases, 19 WM. & MARY ENVrL. L. & POL'Y REv. 223, 230
(1995).
151. See discussion of regimes infa Part IV.B.2.
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population, local opposition to this landfill has had little effect on regulatory agencies or CWM [Chemical Waste
Management, Inc.].152
The results of an ad hoc social movement may be contingent
upon the availability of indigenous resources to provide a rapidand necessary-kick-start.13 Depending upon local qualities and imperatives, resources may take varying forms. The group Mothers of
East Los Angeles successfully linked Latino culture and languages to
mobilization efforts, defeating proposals for constructing a state
prison and an incinerator in East Los Angeles. In mobilizing
against additional sites in Louisiana's Cancer Alley, activists organized a two-state (Louisiana and Mississippi) effort through the Gulf
Coast Tenant Leadership Development Project, a preexisting and
predominantly African American organization with both local and
larger roots." Such an example indicates that exogenous assistance
also may be welcomed. Although the October 1982 protests of the
Warren County Citizens Group in North Carolina were rooted in
indigenous citizens and resources, as participants engaged in selfeducation about technical issues concerning PCBs, the "presence of
national civil rights figures and members of the national Black Congressional Caucus served to 'link
the protest to larger civil rights and
'poor people's' movements.' 51 6
2. State and Local Governmental Regimes
The structure, racial or ethnic composition, and current ideological character of governmental entities are important and highly
contingent factors in how policy decisions are made and environmental concerns addressed.5 7 At the upper levels of governmental

152. Bailey & Faupel, supra note 38, at 151. A large number of Black residents
work for CWM and are relatively well paid, creating tensions among African Americans as well as with Whites. Id. at 148-49.
153. See generally MORRIS, supra note 11 (discussing the potentially determinative
character of indigenous resources within social movements).
154. See Austin & Schill, supra note 49, at 62.
155. See Beverly Wright et al., Coping with Poisons in Cancer Alley, in UNEQUAL
PROTECTION, supra note 1, at 121.
156. Ken Geiser & Gerry Waneck, PCBs and Warren County, in UNEQUAL PROTECION, supra note 1, at 52.

157. During an industrial siting process, for example, "[t]he opposition or support
of local or federal politicians may influence an owner's selection of a particular site,
through public relations and media efforts, tax breaks, relationships with a particular
industry, or other incentives." Freeman & Godsil, supra note 35, at 559. To the extent
that siting decisions usually already have been made before they are publicized, such
claims primarily are post hoc. See discussion supra Part I.B.
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influences, "conjoint federalism describes a relationship in which
state and federal authority blend and apply concurrently to the ob5 8 While there is constancy
jects of regulation.""
linked to
9
incrementalism,' federal programs may shift somewhat with the
political tides.' 6' But with wide variation from state to state in the
quality of environmental programs and levels of fiscal and political
support for their administration, 61 states exercise great discretion in
their commitments to environmentalism-but
vary little in their
16
commitments to economic growth.
Moving further down the governmental queue, the relationship
among race, local governments, and growth ideology is complex,
but the increasing presence of minority elected officials is indicative
of certain cohesive principles that often are overlooked by journalistic accounts of minority electoral success and the relationship of
environmental movements to officeholders. Importantly, the uneven
distribution of benefits and burdens does not simply result from the
actions, deliberate or otherwise, of White governmental officials.
Even minority-headed governing coalitions's may fall prey to
growth politics, leading to an uneven distribution of benefits.'" How
might this occur? While upper-, middle-, and lower-status minority

158. FIORINO, supra note 5, at 85.
159. See supra Part IV.A.3.
160. See discussion infra Part IV.B.3.
161.

See CHRISTOPHER J. DUERKSEN,

ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF STATE

INDUSTRIAL PLANT SITING 218-19 (1983).
162. See Luke W. Cole, Correspondence, Remedies for Racism: A View From the Field,
90 MICH. L. REV. 1991, 1993-94 (1992) (stating that states have economic interest in
siting just like corporations, but states are more vulnerable to political pressure; nevertheless, states are not neutral go-betweens, and will site despite community
outcry); see also discussions supra Parts I.A. and IV.A.2.
163. Professor Reed aptly labels these "black urban regimes," although presumably his discussion could apply to other minority-headed coalitions. See Adolph L.
Reed, Jr., The Black Urban Regime: Structural Origins and Constraints,1 COMP. URB. &
COMMUNITY RES. 138 (1988); see also STONE, supra note 130 (discussing Atlanta's
electoral and governing coalitions).
164. For example, "[i]n 1987, residents of Los Angeles, California, successfully
blocked the construction of a garbage incinerator, the Los Angeles City Energy Recovery Project (LANCER), in a predominantly African American inner-city
neighborhood. This resulted from a five-year struggle which involved the repeated
mobilization of hundreds of residents for demonstrations and hearings. Their struggle was complicated by the fact that Los Angeles' mayor, Tom Bradley, and other
elected officials were African American." Lee, supra note 27, at 17 (citing D. Russell,
Environmental Racism: Minority Communities and Their Battles Against Toxics, 11
AMIcUS J. 22 (1989)). On the theory behind differential outcomes under minorityheaded governing coalitions, see Reed, supra note 163. See also Steven A. Light,
There's More Than Meets the Eye: Southern Cities and Minority Political Empowerment
Following the 1965 Voting Rights Act (unpublished manuscript presented at 1995
American Political Science Ass'n Annual Meeting, on file with author).
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voters all may have been integral to an electoral coalition, the maintenance of the governing coalition is of primary concern to any
elected officials, including minorities.'6 Effectively, this phenomenon fuses the interests of upper- and middle-status minorities with
those of White business elites. Resultant growth coalitions thus are
that defines lower-status interests out of
forged within a consensus
66
the benefit package.

It is possible to imagine "benefit packages" which include facilities portending high degrees of environmental degradation but
also jobs and increased economic growth. Professor Robert Bullard
writes that consideration of such trade-offs
is especially true for poor communities that are beset with
rising unemployment, extreme poverty, a shrinking tax
base, and decaying business infrastructure. Compensation,
economic incentives, and monetary inducements have been
proposed, for example, as an alternative strategy to minimize citizen opposition to hazardous-waste facility siting.
The endorsement of trade-offs usually
emanates from city
1 67
leaders rather than from local citizens.
Regardless of the racial composition of governmental institutions,
resistance may be non-existent or weakened by the presence of progrowth minority leadership and intragroup dissension' 68 based on
the perceived benefits of employment opportunities. Empirical results concur, and suggest a general perceptiveness among affected
minority citizens for which they are infrequently given credit. Surveys of nine residential communities of color in which industrial
facilities were located suggested that over half of the respondents
"believed that residents in their community were accepting health
risks as a trade-off for jobs," thus undergoing what one authority
labels "environmental blackmail." 169
165. See generally THE POLITICS OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 130.

166. See generally Adolph L. Reed, Jr., A Critique of Neo-Progressivism in Theorizing
About Local Development Policy: A Case Study from Atlanta, in THE POLITICS OF URBAN
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 130; Reed, supra note 163; see also Clarence N. Stone, Preemptive Power: Floyd Hunter's "Community Power Structure" Reconsidered, 32 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 82-104 (1988).
167. BULLARD, supra note 34, at 90.

168. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 49 (describing internecine conflict over the
tradeoffs between jobs and environmental degradation in Noxubee County, Missis-

sippi).
169. BULLARD, supra note 34, at 90-91. Minorities may act on their information or
perceptions of the situation. For example, the Rosebud Reservation-based Good Road
Coalition, a Native American group in South Dakota, defeated plans for a garbage
landfill on the reservation, as a recall election defeated the landfill proposal and several tribal council leaders. See Austin & Schill, supra note 49, at 62-63. Tribal members

Michigan Journalof Race & Law

[VOL. 2:1

3. National Actors
At the national level, opportunities to access political and governmental bodies, and alter policy outcomes, are subject to the
vagaries of political-economic climate. Legislative, administrative,
and regulatory avenues often are relatively closed, while litigative
claims of environmental degradation run up against a judicial system that is by and large oriented toward the status quo.
Within the executive branch, the EPA determines the extent of
its role in civil rights concerns, which have been negligible and often
counterproductive.' 70 Until the outset of the Clinton Administration,
there were no executive directives surrounding environmental justice issues.17' To the extent that the environmental justice movement
has been successful in its efforts to place the topic of environmental
justice on the agenda of federal agencies,1 it also has been limited
by the incremental nature of policy changes within structures that
are subject to both bureaucratic and political cross-pressures.7 In
any case, executive orders effectively can be here one day and gone
the next, depending on political whims and electoral cycles. 74
The creation of federal legislation is mediated by institutional
composition, structural characteristics, and politicized processes.175
As things stand, inequities may be more pervasive in environmental
law because of a general absence of minority involvement and
thus mobilized against their own leaders, rather than against an external symbol of
oppression.
170. For example, studies have found that "cleanup of toxic Superfund sites takes
longer to occur and the level of cleanup is less rigorous in communities of color than
in white communities. Those who pollute are likely to pay significantly lower fines if
they pollute in communities of color than in white communities.... These reports
indicate that causal data or health-based assessments are of little value if the community cannot get adequate response and action from government officials" such as
those at the EPA. Rebecca Head, Health-Based Standards: What Role in Environmental
Justice? in ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 53 (citing Marianne Lavelle &
Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection: The Racial Divide in Environmental Law, NAT'L L.J.
Sept. 21, 1992, at $1-$12). For a general account of the EPA's history, see FIORINO,
supra note 5, at 38-43.
171. See Lazarus, supra note 10, at 829.
172. See supra note 112 (discussing Executive Order 12,898).
173. See supra Part IV.A.3. For example, backing off from his 1992 green platform,
President Clinton signed a 1995 rescission bill allowing timber companies to log
lands that were previously off-limits. See Margaret Kriz, Not-So-Silent Spring, 1996
NAT'LJ. 522, 524.
174. See FIORINO, supra note 5, at 70-77 (discussing various presidential administrations' use of mechanisms for executive office control over environmental policy).
On recent political dynamics, see generally THE CLINTON PRESIDENCY: FIRST APPRAISALS (Colin Campbell & Bert A. Rockman eds., 1996).
175. See, e.g., JOHN W. KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN'S VOTING DECISIONS (3d ed. 1989)
(examining individual floor voting decisions in view of the influence of internal congressional structures and administrative interactions).
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interest representation at the national level, centralized
decisionmaking (environmental laws are made and enforcement
priorities set inside the Beltway), and the role of competing interest
groups which reach compromises with industry and focus on
nonurban environments.'7 6 When it comes to the prospects for new
legislation, Congress is subject to competing cross-pressures by
virtue of its pluralized nature and electoral flux. Additionally,
political climate and the partisan or ideological composition of the
two houses are important factors in the likelihood of environmental
claims acquiring legislative purchase. Under Congress' current
ideological composition and the general flow of political tides, major
new legislation that incorporates disparate impact standards is
unlikely; indeed, even in the somewhat ideologically moderated
post-Contract with America legislative environment, existing
environmental regulations repeatedly have been threatened.'"
In the courts, the road toward pressing efficacious environmental justice claims-under Title VI or otherwise-may be strewn
with fewer or lesser obstacles, depending upon the composition of
the judiciary. Regardless of what one believes about the ability of
federal judges to apply the law, their decisions may be mediated by
the ideology of the president who appointed them,78 or colored by
changing interpretations of the law itself.

176. See Lazarus, supra note 10, at 806-08.
177. The Contract with America did not explicitly mention the environment, but
included proposals to decrease the power of government regulations and to require
federal compensation to landowners who faced federal property restrictions. Although these proposals faltered in the Senate, House conservatives recently moved to
include provisions to ease water pollution controls and wetland protections by altering the 1972 Clean Water Act. Blocked by a coalition of moderate Republicans and
Democrats, another successful challenge occurred through budget restrictions on the
EPA's enforcement capabilities. See Kriz, supra note 173, at 523-24. Although House
Republicans appear to have backed off somewhat from their original antiregulatory
stances, environmentalists agree that the threat to environmental agencies, programs,
and regulations has not ended.
178. For example, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP suitslegal actions brought in attempts to stifle political speech), as well as takings challenges, are litigation strategies employed by industry/siting supporters. These claims
often are heard by the U.S. Claims Court, comprised in large part of conservative
Reagan appointees who often side with landowners. See JACQUELINE VAUGHN
SwTzER, ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: DOMESTIC AND GLOBAL DIMENSIONS 93-95

(1994) (citing Penelope Canan & George W. Pring, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation,35 SOC. PROBS. 506 (1988), and RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985)).
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C. Title VI: A Bullet, Just Not Magic, or Even Silver
Environmental litigation under Title VI is bound to meet with
more success than claims under the Equal Protection Clause, if only
because of Title VI's less onerous burden of proof. Accordingly, Title
VI claims will achieve the benefits of litigation. This is the position
taken by much of the recent legal scholarship concerning the environmental justice movement.'9 That position, however, overlooks
the forest for the trees by failing to position litigation of any sort
within the larger contexts of the environmental justice movement
and political economy. The impetuses for and growth of the environmental justice movement and the overarching considerations of
political economy indicate that litigation strategies may harm more
than help the movement. When viewed within these contexts, Title
VI litigation is seen for what it is: a potentially viable legal strategy,
but no more. Within legal academia, attorney and activist Luke Cole
has spearheaded criticism of litigation, and the corresponding role of
attorneys, in the environmental justice movement.'O His assertions,
though perhaps disappointing to well-intentioned lawyers, provide
a practical approach to utilizing legal strategies within the environmental justice movement. Cole's approach is bolstered by the
conclusions reached in this Part.
1. Benefits
Litigation in general, and litigation under Title VI in particular,
is not without its benefits, both to individual successful litigants and
to causes championed by particular litigation. In the environmental
context, one such benefit is simple, yet important: litigation frames
environmental racism as a civil rights violation. The act of filing a
lawsuit claiming a civil rights violation has symbolic value: "The
mere filing of a formal complaint provides a very powerful and
visible statement by minorities regarding their belief that distributional inequities exist in environmental protection." 8' Lawsuits have
both legal and political ramifications: they can lift community morale, strengthen and raise the profile of an activist group, and build
political momentum. 82 Thus, the courts can play a political role help-

179. See supra Part III.B.
180. For a nonenvironmental critique of Title VI's efficacy, see STEPHEN C.
HALPERN, ON THE LIMITS OF THE LAW: THE IRONIC LEGACY OF TITLE VI OF THE 1964

CrvIL RIGHTS ACT (1995).
181. Lazarus, supra note 10, at 828-29.
182. See Cole, supra note 126, at 541.
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ful to the environmental justice movement.'s Even in our increasingly litigious society, lawsuits generate publicity for a cause'8 and
accordingly educate the public, perhaps inspiring new activists."'
Education of the judiciary through litigation (arguably one of the
only ways to do so) is another key benefit of litigation.' Most obvious, of course, is the possibility of redress. If successful, litigation
may prevent a siting and avoid health risks, or, less desirably, redress harms already incurred. A successful lawsuit has more than
as it represents official validation of a
practical benefits, however,
87
community's claims.
2. Limitations
Litigation under Title VI, despite the almost uniform endorsement by the legal academia,'88 nevertheless has the same limitations
inherent in litigation in general. In the environmental context, these
limitations become particularly important when viewed against the
backdrop of political economy and its constants and variables.8 9
a. Structuraland InstitutionalRacism
Most important, litigation removes an issue from the community and places it into the courts, thus seeking to resolve an issue of
racism in a forum notorious for favoring affluent Whites.' 9 Lawsuits
take place in "fora where the abundant resources of private corporations and governmental entities carry the day, and where strategic
decisions are placed in the hands of legal and scientific 'experts'
rather than members of the affected community."' 9' Even more fundamental, the costliness of toxic tort litigation generally precludes
minorities and the poor from pursuing suits and settlements. 92 The
183. See SWITZER, supra note 178, at 66 ("[T]he courts are now becoming the arena
of choice for resolving all types of environmental disputes.").
184. See Cole, supra note 126, at 541.
185. See Austin & Schill, supra note 49, at 64-65; Cole, supra note 126, at 541;
Lazarus, supra note 10, at 829 (listing political education and gaining allies as political benefits of litigation).
186. See Cole, supra note 126, at 541.
187. See Lazarus, supra note 10, at 829.
188. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
189. See supra Parts IV.A and IV.B.
190. See supra Part IV.A.1. But see, e.g., Pugliese, supra note 112, at 1203 ("Courts,
independent and impartial, are frequently defenders of racial groups injured at the
expense of the majority.").
191. Torres, supra note 74, at 451.
192. See Austin & Schill, supra note 49, at 65.
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disadvantages to affected communities work to the advantage of
corporate interests:
It is to industry's advantage to litigate environmental
regulations because the process has the net effect of stalling
the implementation of rules. Industry can demur during
the policy formation and adoption stage, thereby avoiding
in hopes of
the bad press that comes from such activity,
3
moving the courts closer to their position.1
Institutional racism ignores or underestimates the real concerns of
communities that bear the burdens of environmental racism. This
factor comes into play both in recognizing and addressing environmental racism. "Public health and other governmental officials need
to change their assumptions about the intellectual abilities of lowincome people and minorities to understand complex information
and include them as partners in solving community environmental
problems as opposed to dysfunctional adversaries lacking the capacity to understand complex scientific information."' 94 In the courts,
lawyers (on either side of the dispute) and judges similarly may underestimate the ability of affected individuals to grasp the legal and
scientific aspects of their cases.
b. Growth Imperatives
Litigation directly pits the environmental concerns of an individual or a community against economic growth. Judges may be
likely to share the generally positive opinion of economic growth
and development.'9 Likewise, scientific experts, on whom environmental litigation relies, may "nonetheless succumb to social controls
6f powerful forces to use science in a discourse to narrate a certain

193. SWITZER, supra note 178, at 67 (citing LETrIE M. WENNER, THE ENVIRONMENTAL DECADE IN COURT (1982)).
194. Bunyan Bryant & Paul Mohai, Summary, in RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS, supra note 12, at 217-18. As Professor Bryant has observed:
To use the resources and capabilities of community people in the problem-

solving process, and thus enhance their cooperation, assumptions about their
lack of "smartness" need to be challenged; they must be perceived as smart,
concerned, caring, serious enough about being engaged in the problemsolving process, and able to follow through on responsibilities.

Bunyan Bryant, Issues and PotentialPolicies and Solutions for Environmental Justice: An
Overview, in ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 13.
195. See supra Part IV.A.2.
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political and economic reality.' ' 196 More important, because economics, rather than social equity, is the driving force behind
environmental decisions, challenges to the legality of those decisions
(through civil9 rights
litigation) do not have a real impact on the de7
cisionmakers.
c. Incremental Nature of Policy Changes and Litigation
The very nature of a legal victory is tenuous. Statutes may be
amended or repealed, and court decisions can be overruled or distinguished. Laws mean little without a social movement to support
and continue them; without such a movement, any declaration of
victory is premature, and any progress is tenuous.9 The ongoing
erosion of civil rights laws (of which Title VI is a part) serves as an
example:
Just as antidiscrimination laws have not yet fully extricated
our society from the manifestations of racial discrimination, neither can they wholly deliver us from the
environmental dilemmas that overburden people of color.
Therefore, if our goal is the alleviation of the disparate environmental burdens faced by people of color, then the
Equal Protection Clause and existing antidiscrimination
laws can render only partial victories.'
As one commentator has pointed out, the courts have been slow to
apply the modifications of the Civil Rights Restoration Act and the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, thus making litigation under the civil rights
laws tougher for plaintiffs than it should be. 200
A lawsuit may go only as far as its legal claims allow. Title VI's
framework will not cover every complaint of environmental racism,
as communities and courts may have different ideas about what
constitutes a "substantial legitimate justification"' ' such that will
validate a challenged decision. Similarly, a community's failure to
prove a disparate impact does not necessarily mean that none exists.
"[W]hile lawsuits can alleviate the most egregious instances of
environmental race discrimination, many disparities that result from
196. Bryant, supra note 13, at 15-16.
197. See Cole, supra note 162, at 1997.
198. See STEPHEN L. WASBY, RACE RELATIONS LITIGATION IN AN AGE OF COMPLEXITY 109 (1995); Luke W. Cole, Foreword: A Jeremiad on Environmental Justice and
the Law, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. at'ix (1995).
199. Torres, supra note 74, at 445 (footnote omitted).
200. See Fisher, supra note 10, at 313.
201. See Elston v. Talladega County Bd., 997 F.2d 1394, 1407 (11th Cir. 1993).
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environmental decisions and policies can only be addressed through
political means." 2 Whether a complaint "fits" within Title VI will
determine not only the likelihood of success but the degree of
validity the complaint is accorded. The merit of a legal claim
is
20 3
defined by its limits, as Bean and R.I.S.E. certainly demonstrate.
In the same way, legal claims are bounded by scientism. As one
prominent judge recently proclaimed, "Law lags science; it does not
lead it."2°4 Judges depend on expert testimony to explain scientific
aspects of a case.05 Courts are less open to opinions on the edge, preferring facts and methodology generally accepted within the
scientific community.0 6 This judicial attitude has the effect of preserving the status quo. In the context of an environmental claim,
[rielying solely on proof of a cause-and-effect relationship
as defined by traditional epidemiology disguises the exploitative way the polluting industries have operated in
some communities and condones a passive acceptance of
the status quo. Because it is difficult to establish causation,
polluting industries have the upper hand. They can always
hide behind "science" and demand "proof' that their activities are harmful to humans or the environment.207

202. Torres, supra note 74, at 450-51.
203. See supra Part I.A.
204. Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 1996) (Chief Judge Posner). But see Heidi Li Feldman, Science and Uncertainty in Mass Exposure Litigation, 74
TEx. L. REV. 1 (1995) (arguing that tort reforms may be necessary for courts to consider conflicting scientific evidence).
205. One commentator has termed agencies' exaggerated representations of scientific findings in the siting process as "the science charade." Wagner, supra note 6, at
1617. Professor Wagner calls for "a legal remedy that requires agencies to separate
science from policy and entrusts the courts with reviewing the accuracy of these science-policy delineations." Id.
206. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993).
207. Bullard, supra note 65, at 21 (footnote omitted). Institutional racism intersects
with scientism, further weighting outcomes against affected communities. For example, scientists link medical problems to poor diet, cigarettes, and drug and alcohol
use instead of toxins. See e.g., Austin & Schill, supra note 49, at 67. Karl Grossman
points out the irony of human versus animal concerns using the example of the
"nine-legged frog." People accept animal deformities and death as result of environmental conditions, while human deformity and death must clear the hurdle of ruling
out "fault" in the form of smoking, poor prenatal care, diet, etc., before environmental causes are blamed. Grossman, supra note 1, at 282. Newly adopted EPA risk
assessment standards are intended to better account for possible shortcomings of
epidemiological studies, but the results remain to be seen. See generally Cushman,
supra note 62.
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The paradox of legal standards and scientism is that "certainty" is
not required for siting, but is required for preventing or removing a
siting.
d. Minority Outgroupsand OrganizationalStructure
Litigation generally is individualized. Often only the named
plaintiffs may win. Cases resulting in individual settlements or
judgments necessarily involve unequal distribution of benefits and
thus may divide a community, creating intragroup dissatisfaction. 2°9
Segments of a community also may disagree about what constitutes
a "benefit," dividing over economic benefits versus environmental
harm.210
Just as community organization is fundamental to the environmental justice movement, it is fundamental to strategic, rather than
piecemeal, litigation. As Luke Cole has observed, Title VI litigation
has yet to be employed by organized groups.21 This, in itself, may
undercut the future efficacy of Title VI as a legal strategy, as case law
is created without an overarching litigative strategy to guide it, perhaps resulting in negative precedent. 12 "Community groups should
be part of any programs that reduce pollution," including litigation.2 13 Title VI litigation has yet to appeal in any widespread manner
to minority organizations.
e. State, Local, and National Actors
Litigation is affected by state, local, and national actors, both
inside and outside the court. The outcome of a case may depend in
part on the judge who hears it, and the posture of a case is shaped by

208. Bryant, supra note 194, at 10-14 ("Traditional research prevents us from, ddressing pollution issues in a timely manner."). Further, "[a]s scientists begin to
obtain more answers to hypotheses through scientific methodology and the quantification of data, they will also continue to broaden their decision-making power, thus
leaving communities of color and low-income groups marginalized with few democratic decision-making alternatives." Id. at 11.
209. See Austin & Schill, supra note 49, at 68.
210. See Schneider, supra note 49.
211. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
212. Compare, for example, the broad and deliberate litigation strategies that resulted in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971). See, e.g., MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP'S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987); Deborah L. Markowitz, In Pursuit of Equality:
One Woman's Work to Change the Law, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 335 (1992) (describing

Ruth Bader Ginsburg's role in shaping sex discrimination law).
213. Bunyan Bryant, Summary, in ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 213.
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the arguments presented by the parties. One commentator has
charged that the civil rights laws have become inadequate to address
racism due to case law created by judges unsympathetic to claims of
racism.214 Local, state, or national political climates may influence
both the posture and the outcome of a particular case. More broadly,
legal remedies have a national/institutional focus which is at odds
with the local grassroots nature of the environmental justice movement.1 5
The EPA emerges as the key national actor in the environmental
racism has gone from assumcontext. Its approach to environmental
S216
ing a stance of purposeful ignorance to acting as the principal
investigator of Title VI administrative claims. As recently as 1992,
the EPA took the position that exposure to toxins did not lead directly to adverse health effects, noting the complicating factor of
minorities' "heightened sensitivity" to toxic exposure.218 When
agencies on any level employ scientific risk assessment, they "are not
held accountable for the costs they impose on society when they issue regulations." 9 The political stance of the EPA obviously impacts
its investigation of Title VI complaints. =
The courts are not outside the political process."' Heralding
litigation as the answer to environmental racism assumes open
access points within a pluralistic political process that is amenable to
change and to overcoming majoritarian or elite imperatives. Such a
stance overlooks the fact that by the time a lawsuit is filed, the
affected community's lack of economic and political power already
has resulted in adverse political decisions.m This fact has led many
commentators to conclude that legal tactics may distract from a

214. Cole, supra note 162, at 1997.
215. Cole, supra note 198 (arguing that the focus on legal strategies flawed the
traditional environmental movement).
216. See discussion supra Part IV.B.3.
217. See Cole, supra note 124.
218. Lazarus, supra note 10, at 804-05 & n.64 (1993) (citing 1992 EPA Environmental Equity Report finding (1) that exposure to toxins is not the same as adverse
health effects, (2) that there is a lack of data relating race to adverse health effects
(rather than just exposure), (3) an admission that minorities are more likely to be
exposed to toxins, and (4) that the disproportionality of adverse health effects among
races is in part because of the type of activities minorities engage in (for example,
migrant workers are likely to breathe pesticides) and the heightened sensitivity of
minorities to environmental effects).
219. FIORINO, supra note 5, at 116.
220. See, e.g., Cushman, supra note 62.
221. HALPERN, supra note 180, at 307-09 (discussing courts' application and interpretation of Title VI under various administrations).
222. See, e.g., Torres, supra note 74.
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community's strongest weapon: political protest.2 Indeed, one
commentator has suggested that the existence of environmental
racism shows that environmental laws are working because
disparate impact is essentially their intent: the laws were lobbied for,
drafted by, and passed by non-minorities seeking to protect their
own communities and neighborhoods from exposure to pollutants.'
Economics, rather than legality, drives the decisions of actors on all
governmental levels. Thus, litigation does not address what is in
essence a political problem.2
3. Strategic Employment of Title VI Litigation to Minimize
Limitations and Maximize Benefits
Luke Cole, perhaps the most vocal critic in the legal community
of litigation strategies within the environmental justice movement,
nevertheless would not abandon litigation entirely.226 Instead, as he
terms it, litigation is "[a]nother [s]tone in David's [s]ling."2 7

223. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 10, at 331-32.
224. Cole, supra note 162, at 1995.
225. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 162, at 1997 ("[A]ny legal strategy not firmly
grounded in, and secondary to, a community-based political organizing strategy is
ripe for failure."); Pugliese, supra note 112 (arguing that the executive, rather than the
courts, is in the best position to efficaciously disseminate empirical evidence and
thus influence decisionmakers).
Cole praises what he terms the "power" or "grassroots activists" model of environmental advocacy, arguing that it (1) creates political influence through an active
community presence, (2) teaches both use and distrust of the system, (3) teaches
communities to take control of their own environments (self-determination), and (4)
builds a local movement (which is the necessary foundation of the larger movement).
In this model, litigation is only one tool in creating political power, and thus this
model comes closest to addressing the real problem of powerlessness, Cole argues,
because it goes beyond mere opposition to initiation and implementation of goals.
Next best is what Cole calls the "participatory" or "public citizens" model, which
manages to educate the community and decisionmakers, builds the movement by
bringing in new activists, and holds agencies accountable by bringing them face to
face with affected citizens. The least desirable model of environmental advocacy,
according to Cole, is what he terms "professional" or "macho law brains." This
model relies primarily on litigation, concentrating power and decisionmaking in
attorneys rather than the affected community. It fails to educate the community or
decisionmakers, and builds only a particular legal argument, not the larger movement. "Most environmental justice activists should agree that the professional model
is a waste of time from the perspective of the community." Luke W. Cole, Macho Law
Brains,Public Citizens, and GrassrootsActivists: Three Models of Environmental Advocacy,
14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 687, 708 (1995).
226. See Cole, supra note 126, at 541. Cole does, however, note that he and his colleagues "strongly recommend againstlawsuits whenever possible." Id.
227. Id. at 523.
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Cole sets out a comprehensive approach for choosing a litigation strategy. First, however, an affected community should ask
whether it wants to pursue litigation at all: "Before a community
group embarks on a legal course, however, a threshold question
must be answered: Will a lawsuit help or hurt the community's
struggle?"m If the answer is to proceed with litigation, Cole recommends pursuing the following legal claims, in order of preference:
(1) traditional environmental law claims, (2) unusual environmental
law claims, (3) statutory civil rights claims, and (4) constitutional
civil rights claims.m
Interestingly, claims under Title VI, which fall under the category of statutory civil rights claims, are Cole's third choice in a
disfavored strategy. Cole notes that claims under the civil rights
laws may give the court a more complete picture of what is happening in the community-that is, that racism is involved."' Close
behind Title VI claims in Cole's approach are the uniformly unsuccessful claims under the Equal Protection Clause. Although noting
that no plaintiff has prevailed under the Equal Protection Clause in
an environmental suit, Cole concedes that like statutory civil rights
claims, an equal protection claim may have political import in posturing the claim as a civil rights violation.23'
Cole further cautions that if litigation is to serve the larger environmental justice movement, its employment must be strategic.2 2 He
suggests, most importantly, to follow the approach outlined above
and to use factually strong cases.u3 Additionally, he warns that litiM
gation should be pursued only in context of political organization.
Cole's strategy is in line with the situating of Title VI litigation
within political economy and the environmental justice movement.
Title VI claims may not prove to be as ineffective as equal protection
claims were. Nevertheless, Title VI does not have the powers of the
magic bullet the legal academia has presented it to be. Title VI litigation must be pursued cautiously and strategically, with an eye to
the larger environmental justice movement; however, this approach
is not yet the case.

228. Id. at 524.
229. Id. at 526.
230. Id. at 530.
231. Id. at 538-41.
232. Id. at 543-44. As Professor Stephen L. Wasby cautions, however, "[A]lthough
organizational litigators attempt 'planned litigation for social change' in which they
choose areas of law on which to focus their efforts and cases in which to invest resources, many aspects of that litigation turn out to be unplanned, and much about
the litigation is not simple and linear." WASBY, supra note 198, at x.
233. Cole, supra note 126, at 544.
234. Id. at 545.
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CONCLUSION
Recent legal literature has propounded environmental claims
brought under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act as an effective strategy
for environmental justice advocates. Title VI's champions, however,
fail to critically examine both the efficacy of Title VI litigation
against the backdrop of political economy, and the effect of reliance
on Title VI litigation on the larger environmental justice movement.
Situating Title VI litigation within political-economic analysis leads
to the same conclusion that a few critics have reached by simply assuming litigation's general drawbacks: Title VI is not a magic bullet,
but simply an additional legal strategy with the same limitations
and benefits of litigation in general. Examining environmental racism in the context of political-economic processes and imperatives,
however, brings to light the particular limitations of litigation within
larger social movements.
Title VI claims, even successful ones, do little to change the constant barriers and variable contexts which both give rise to the
problem of environmental racism and challenge the environmental
justice movement in addressing it. These political-economic factors
must be addressed by means which are just that: political and economic."' Almost by definition, litigation is not likely to successfully
take on the very forces that create and shape the legal claims which
make up its form.
Legal fora, as do other political institutions, bear the marks of
structural and institutional racism, growth imperatives, and incremental alteration. Litigation is impacted by these marks, but unlike
other environmental strategies, it fails to meaningfully address

235. See HALPERN, supra note 180, at 321 ("[L]itigation has not proven to be an
effective substitute for political nerve and will."); WASBY, supra note 198, at 107 ("The
myth of rights, in exaggerating the change lawyers and litigation can accomplish,
interferes with allocation of resources to techniques of political mobilization that
might more effectively achieve rights."); Cole, supra note 126, at 524 (arguing that the
single largest strategic and tactical drawback to legal remedies is that environmental
justice necessarily is about politics and economics, not law).
236. Among community activists,
[liegal expertise is decidedly deemphasized. The grass-roots folks spend a
good deal of their time battling experts-bureaucrats, engineers, epidemiologists, lawyers-in an effort to make questions of risk distribution not simply a
matter of science and technology but also a matter of politics and social responsibility. They have reason to be wary of undue reliance on their own
experts. The stress placed on direct action means that the law and access to
legal forums are more important to grass-roots environmentalists than are the
lawyers themselves.
Austin & Schill, supra note 49, at 64.
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them. Until recently, the law, like government, has endorsed environmental racism.
[T]he current environmental protection paradigm has institutionalized unequal enforcement, traded human health
for profit, placed the burden of proof on the "victims"
rather than on the polluting industry, legitimated human
exposure to harmful substances, promoted "risky" technologies such as incinerators, exploited the vulnerability of
economically and politically disenfranchised communities,
subsidized ecological destruction, created an industry
around risk assessment, delayed cleanup actions, and
failed to develop pollution prevention as the overarching
and dominant strategy. z7
The bottom line is that the accepted role of courts is to enforce the
law, not to achieve social equity.
Variables affecting the political-economic climate impact litigation as well. Importantly, litigation is most effective when employed
strategically, as Luke Cole has urged.28 Strategic litigation requires
organization within both an affected community and the larger environmental justice movement. To date, claims brought under Title VI
reflect neither. Actors at the local, state, and national levels are influenced more by the economics of their actions than by the legality,
further undercutting the efficacy of litigation strategies.
Title VI will not provide a cure-all for environmental inequities
any more than other legal strategies. Indeed, the only real difference
between claims brought under Title VI and those brought under the

237. Bullard, supra note 65, at 3. Professor Plater, on the other hand, argues that
environmental law has been preceded by social activism, not the other way around.
"[Einvironmental law has developed its complex, extended, doctrinal structure in a

process dependent upon confrontational, pluralistic citizen activism, operating in
every area of governance, but particularly in judicial and administrative litigation."
Zygmunt J.B. Plater, From the Beginning, a Fundamental Shift of Paradigms: A Theory
and Short History of Environmental Law, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 981, 983 (1994). While
Plater's main thrust concerning a 1960s-era shift toward citizen-generated public

interest litigation and congressionally created citizen enforcement provisions is well
taken, one must be careful to recall that environmental lawmaking and litigation by
their very nature remain inherently esoteric and elitist. Thus, Plater's "Pluralist
Paradigm" may hold true in a general sense, yet in no way suggests that political

processes have been easily accessed or altered. Nor is it indicative that grassroots
activism has led the way (if it had, minorities and lower-status citizens presumably
would have had greater say over how laws and policies would affect them). At the
same time that environmental law developed and changed, the modem regulatory
state continued its march toward promoting economic growth and development
while disproportionately shunting environmental burdens onto its impoverished and
minority citizens.

238. See Cole, supra note 126; see also supra Part IV.C.3.
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Equal Protection Clause, in the larger picture of the environmental
justice movement, is that Title VI plaintiffs have a better chance of
winning individual suits.
These observations should not necessarily lead to the conclusion that litigation strategies should be abandoned altogether by
environmental justice advocates. They do, however, strongly caution
against relying too heavily on litigation strategies. As Luke Cole
warns, an "upsurge in legal activity [is a] potentially dangerous development[] for a movement founded on, and dedicated to,
grassroots empowerment."239 Instead, the limitations of litigation
emphasize the need for a multipronged tactical approach 240 which
will empower minorities and facilitate grassroots insurgency, as
these elements increase equitable participation in democratic processes. Strategically, the emphasis of the environmental justice
movement must remain on the roots, rather than the symptoms, of
environmental inequities-economic and political power-thus increasing the pressure for distributive justice.

239. Cole, supra note 198, at ix.

240. For example, Bullard calls for new legislation in the form of a federal "Fair
Environmental Protection Act" (modeled on the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 1968 Fair
Housing Act, and 1965 Voting Rights Act, as amended in 1988), which would employ
a disparate-impact standard, thus addressing both the "intended and unintended effects of public policies, land-use decisions, and industry practices that have a
disparate impact on racial and ethnic minorities, and other vulnerable groups." Robert D. Bullard, Conclusion: Environmentalism with Justice, in CONFRONTING
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, supra note 7, at 203-06. Pressure then would be placed on
the states to follow suit by adopting similar standards.

